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PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following 
entities also were defendants to the plaintiffs' action: 
1. Omni Products, Inc.; 
2. Union Pacific Railroad Company; and 
3. Utah Transit Authority. 
Plaintiffs' theories of liability against these defendants varied, but included strict liability 
and negligence with respect to the design and manufacture of the subject rubber panels at 
the crossing, and public nuisance and negligence with respect to the installation and 
maintenance of those panels. Plaintiffs settled with all of these entities before trial and 
this appeal. They are not parties to this appeal. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Edward George Goebel's and Kathy Goebel's ("Goebels" or "plaintiffs") appeal 
and Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.'s ("SLCSR") cross appeal are from 
final orders and, with respect to the Goebels' appeal, a judgment entered by the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah which is a "court of record." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-1-2.1(3). Because Goebels' appeal and SLCSR's cross-appeal 
both are timely and are from final orders and a judgment of a court of record over which 
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction of this appeal. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0) and § 78-2a-3; Utah R. App. 
P. 3 and 4. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was there sufficient evidence upon which a jury reasonably could have 
concluded that a hazardous condition existed for a long enough period of time that 
SLCSR should have been aware of it and remedied it? This is the central issue raised by 
Goebels' appeal. The standard of review is correction-of-error. Corbett v. Seamons, 904 
P.2d 229, 232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Handy v. Union Pac. RR Co.. 841 P.2d 1210, 1215 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Did the trial court err in not granting a directed verdict for SLCSR on the 
basis of other reasons advanced by SLCSR? The additional reasons were preserved by 
SLCSR's motions for summary judgment and for directed verdict. R. 2065-2069, 1952-
2052, 2076-2620, 4228-4618, 6059, 6767 at Tr. 1161-1162 and 1213-1239. The 
- 1 -
standard of review for these additional reasons, raised by SLCSR in its cross-appeal, also 
is correction-of-error. Gerbich v. Numed. Inc., 1999 UT 37,1f 10, 977 P.2d 1205, 1207; 
Fibro Trust Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc.. 1999 UT 13, % 19, 974 P.2d 288, 295; Truiillo v. 
Jenkins. 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992); Rocklev v. Fairview Care Ctrs.. Inc., 970 
P.2d 277, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
3. Regardless of the Court's ruling on the first or second issue, did the trial 
court err in ruling that SLCSR owed a statutory duty to bicyclists to maintain the crossing 
surface at a crossing that was owned by UTA? SLCSR also preserved this issue in its 
motions for summary judgment and for directed verdict. Because of the continuing 
importance of SLCSR's legal duties with respect to UTA and the public, SLCSR asks the 
Court to rule on this issue even if it otherwise affirms the judgment for SLCSR for other 
reasons. The standard of review is correction-of-error. Id.; Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 
1999 UT 36 H20 17, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings. 
This action is to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium arising from 
Mr. Goebel's bicycle accident when Mr. Goebel fell while riding westbound on 1700 
South in Salt Lake City near railroad tracks at approximately 250 West. The reason why 
Mr. Goebel fell is not known, and the Goebels' theories, and related evidence, are 
discussed below. 
On December 4, 1998, Goebels initiated this action against Omni Products, Inc. 
-?-
("Omni"), Union Pacific Railroad Company ("UP"), Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"), 
SLCSR and Salt Lake City Corporation ("SLC"). They subsequently amended their 
complaint before serving the defendants. R. 1-47. At that time, Goebels claims only 
included negligence against all defendants and strict product liability against Omni. On 
September 9, 1999, Goebels moved to amend their complaint again in order to add, 
among other things, new claims against SLCSR, UP and UTA for liability under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 56-1-11 (styled by Goebels as "Statutory Neglect to Make and Maintain 
Good and Sufficient Crossing"), and against all defendants for public nuisance. Goebels 
also sought to add within their existing negligence claims against SLCSR and UTA a 
new basis for negligence predicated on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 3 24A 
("negligent performance of undertaking"). R. 124-151. No new facts were alleged. 
SLCSR opposed aspects of that motion. R. 167-184. The trial court granted the motion 
to allow the new public nuisance claim predicated on defendants' alleged negligence, but 
denied the other changes because the § 56-1-11 claim was superfluous and added 
nothing new to Goebels already pled negligence claims against these particular 
defendants, and the Restatement basis was too broad and non-specific to notify the 
affected defendants of the basis for their alleged liability. R. 363-369. Goebels objected 
to the proposed order (R. 370-401), and the parties ultimately stipulated to a Second 
Amended Complaint that included the new public nuisance claim and also allowed the 
Restatement basis to be included with more specific allegations. R. 496-541. The 
Second Amended Complaint was filed May 15, 2000. R. 520-541. 
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Thereafter, on April 4, 2001, Goebels and Omni settled and the trial court 
dismissed Omni from this action. R. 808-813. 
On May 1, 2001, approximately two and one-half years after this action was 
commenced and one year after the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, Goebels 
filed a motion to expand the scope of their existing public nuisance claim against all 
remaining defendants to have that claim impose strict liability for the alleged violation of 
§ 56-1-11. R. 826-832. Again, no new facts were alleged. SLCSR opposed that motion. 
R. 849-949. In response, Goebels filed a motion to once again amend their complaint to 
base a strict liability public nuisance claim on § 56-1-11 and also Salt Lake City 
Ordinance § 14.44.030. R. 960-992. Goebels took this tact because their existing public 
nuisance claim was no different than their existing negligence claims because, as they 
stated in their memorandum of points and authorities, "there is utterly no evidence to 
support the idea that the creation of the alleged public nuisance by any of the defendants 
was 'intentional,' 'reckless,' or cultrahazardous.'" R. 968. SLCSR opposed that motion. 
R. 1010-1027. On October 9, 2001, the trial court denied both motions in what is 
referred to herein as the Leave To Amend Order. (Addendum, Tab 5.) In part, the trial 
court ruled that none of the statutes and the ordinance then raised by Goebels (UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 10-7-26 and § 56-1-11, and Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030) 
specifically prohibited the defendants' alleged conduct, there was no basis for allowing 
strict liability under Goebels' public nuisance claims, Goebels did not advise the trial 
court of the specific amendments they sought in a proposed third amended complaint, 
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and defendants would be unfairly prejudiced if such new legal theories were added at 
that stage of the proceedings. 
Subsequently, Salt Lake City was dismissed from the case and UTA and UP 
settled with the Goebels. SLCSR was the only defendant during trial, which commenced 
on July 9, 2002. R. 5986. On the seventh day of trial, Goebels rested their case and 
SLCSR moved for a directed verdict. R. 6059, 6767 at Tr. 1161-1162. SLCSR also 
rested its case later that day and again moved for a directed verdict. R. 6059, 6767 at Tr. 
1207, 1213-1239. The trial court took the motions under advisement, and the next day 
granted a directed verdict for SLCSR on the sole ground that Goebels failed to produce 
any evidence to prove notice of and an opportunity to remedy a dangerous condition. 
Although it had nothing to do with the court's granting of the motion for directed verdict, 
the court gratuitously ruled that SLCSR was the owner or operator of a railroad and 
subject to the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-7-26, § 10-7-29 and § 56-1-11 and 
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030. Goebels' Addendum at 21-35. The trial court's 
order was entered on August 30, 2002, and it is referred to herein as the Directed Verdict 
Order. Addendum, Tab 6. Also on August 30, 2002, the Judgment was entered for 
SLCSR. Id., Tab 8. Before the Directed Verdict Order and Judgement were entered, 
Goebels moved for a new trial and that motion was denied on September 24, 2002. R. 
6729-6730. 
Goebels now have appealed and SLCSR has cross-appealed. SLCSR does not 
appeal the Directed Verdict Order and Judgment entered in its favor, but appeals two of 
-5-
the trial court's other rulings in its Directed Verdict Order (paragraphs 1 and 7), not only 
because they provide alternative bases for the directed verdict and Judgment, but also 
because the dicta that SLCSR is subject to statutory provisions governing those who own 
or operate railways (when SLCSR does neither) is important to the continuing duties and 
rights of SLCSR under common law, statutory law and contracts. SLCSR seeks a ruling 
from this Court that SLCSR is not subject to enactments governing the conduct of those 
who own or operate railroads even if the directed verdict is affirmed on other grounds. 
B. Statement Of Facts. 
Mr. Goebel fell and was severely injured in a bicycle accident on February 19, 
1998 when he was riding his bicycle westbound on 1700 South near or on the railroad 
crossing located at about 250 West in Salt Lake City. A motorist traveling in the same 
direction as Mr. Goebel became aware of a bicyclist passing him on his right as the 
bicycle suddenly went end-over-end. R. 6762 at Tr. 136-37. Neither this witness, nor 
any other witness, saw anything that appeared to cause the bicycle to go end-over-end 
and Mr. Goebel has no recollection of what actually caused his accident. 
The tracks at this crossing were known as the Provo Subdivision Line and had 
been owned for many years by the UP. On October 30, 1992, more than five years 
before this accident, UP sold these tracks to UTA. At that time, UTA intended to build 
and operate light rail passenger ("TRAX") service on this right of way but had no 
intention to provide freight service to the existing freight customers located along these 
tracks. SLCSR was formed to continue freight service to these customers. Thus, when 
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UP sold the tracks to UTA, UP retained a limited easement which allowed it to continue 
freight service on UTA's right of way. This easement was immediately transferred to 
SLCSR. 
SLCSR and UTA also entered into a coordination agreement which further set 
forth the SLCSR's limited use of UTA's railroad and demonstrated UTA's control over 
its railroad. Goebels' Addendum at 43-70. Among other things, UTA, at its sole 
discretion, determined which portions of its railroad would be designated as "Passenger 
Trackage" and which portions would be "Freight Trackage" or "Joint Trackage." 
SLCSR's freight trains were forbidden by the agreement from traveling on whatever 
UTA designated to be Passenger Trackage. Id. at 55, ^  5.1. The coordination agreement 
further restricted the freight service easement in that UTA determined what times of day 
SLCSR could operate on UTA's railroad. Id. at 55-56, % 5.4. The coordination 
agreement required SLCSR only to maintain crossings on Freight Trackage to the extent 
necessary for its freight service: 
"[SLCSR] shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and shall not conduct 
directly or indirectly,... any other activity whatsoever on the Right-of-Way 
that is not necessary to Freight Rail Service." Id. at 48-49, ^ 2.1 (emphasis 
added). 
"Freight Rail Service" is defined in the agreement as "the common carrier rail freight 
operations to be conducted by [SLCSR] on the Right-of-Way." Id. at 45. All other 
activity expressly was prohibited. Id- at 48-49, U 2.1, (emphasis added). 
SLCSR did not agree to maintain the crossing surface, on behalf of the owner, 
UTA, and did not assume any duty of the property owner to provide a reasonably safe 
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surface for bicyclists or other travelers over UTA's crossings. In fact, pursuant to the 
coordination agreement, SLCSR was barred from doing anything other than what was 
necessary for freight service. Contrary to the statement Goebels made in their brief, at 
page 9, SLCSR never was "in possession" of the crossing. It merely had a right to 
operate over portions of it for a limited purpose and at times dictated by UTA. 
At the time of the accident, UTA was in the process of refurbishing its railroad 
line, including the replacement of crossings with cement panels instead of wooden 
planks or rubber pads. The subject crossing was removed and replaced in August of 
1998, by UTA, some six months after the accident. 
To construct a grade crossing, one must place some material between the rails and 
on the roadway leading up to the rails that will make the road surface almost even with 
the top of the rails. The surface of this material must be slightly lower than the surface of 
the rails and it must be constructed with a narrow trough on the inside of each rail to 
accommodate the flange that exists on all locomotive and railcar wheels. Otherwise, 
trains would derail at crossings. The necessity of a flange groove and the slight 
differences between the surface of the rail and the surface of the roadway makes it 
impossible for grade crossings to be made as smooth as the roadway leading up to them. 
Many materials can be used to construct crossings. Many crossings are simply 
made of dirt or asphalt. For many years, however, wooden planks were the primary 
material used for crossings on more traveled roadways. Crossings built with concrete 
panels or large rubber pads have become more common in recent years. 
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The rubber pads which were in place at 1700 South and 250 West at the time of 
the subject accident replaced the old wooden planking, and were required by SLC years 
before the accident, when UP, who then owned the crossing, was upgrading it. The pads 
between the rails (the "gauge panels") are nominally 29 Vi" X 72" and two pads placed 
side by side are required to fill the space between the rails. Pads outside the rails (the 
"field panels") are nominally 22 lA" X 72" and one pad is placed outside each rail for 
each six linear feet (72 inches) of track. Thus, at the time and place of the accident there 
were a total of four pads for each six linear feet of track. At 1700 South, there were a 
total of forty pads for each set of rails that crossed that street. There were two sets of 
rails, and the accident occurred near the western set. The pads were abutted to each other 
and screwed into the railroad ties. 
Given the width of a street such as 1700 South, there has to be seams where the 
rubber pads, cement panels or wooden planks abut each other. It is not feasible to 
manufacture and install a single pad, panel, or plank that would extend the entire width 
of such a roadway. Therefore, most crossings have seams which generally run in the 
direction of the oncoming highway traffic. Over time, these seams widen from the 
effects of traffic, debris, and the icing and thawing of the debris that works its way into 
the seam. Thus, what Goebels characterize as "gaps," are seams that may widen over 
time. Usually these gaps fill with dirt and other small particle roadway debris. A "gap" 
of an inch or less may not be perceived as a "gap" if it is filled with dirt or other debris. 
Of the forty panels at the 1700 South crossing, only eight were ever relevant to 
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plaintiffs' claims. These panels were numbered one through eight for consistent 
reference to them during trial and the seams between the numbered panels were 
designated by reference to the abutting numbered panels. See the diagram of the 
crossing, Pltfs.' Ex. 54, and the photograph, Deft's Ex. 4 included in the Addendum at 
Tabs 8 and 9. Of the eight panels, the one most south and east was numbered " 1 . " The 
next three pads to the west on the south side were pads "2,", "3" and "4." Pad "5" was 
the most north and west of the eight pads and pad "8" was the pad most to the north and 
east. 
Laying in the hospital, Mr. Goebel had no idea as to what caused his accident. 
Therefore, Mrs. Goebel went to the scene two or three days after the accident. Once 
there, she formulated a theory that on the date of the accident one particular space 
between two of the gauge panels was of such a precise width and depth that it barely 
accommodated the front tire of the bicycle. 
This was the gap between panels that were and are referred to as pads number two 
and seven. See Addendum, Tab 8 and 9. She also noted the next seam to the west but 
still between the rails. This "gap"is between pads number three and six. She determined 
this gap to be progressively more narrow until it could not have accommodated her 
husband's bicycle tire. She surmised that the bicycle tire traveled into the two-seven gap 
and then was pinched or wedged in the three-six gap so as to stop the rotation of the front 
wheel of the bicycle. She, and others after her, took pictures of this particular gap. One 
such photograph is included in the Addendum at Tab 10. This particular gap was the 
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focus of the Goebels' initial complaint and each amended complaint. R. 3, 27, 522. 
Some two and one-half years after the accident and two years after the crossing 
had been taken out of the ground, Goebels1 accident reconstruction expert observed dents 
in the rims of Mr. Goebel's bicycle wheels which he believed evidenced that the wheels 
had struck a hard object with a dramatic amount of force at the time of the accident. This 
conclusion was confirmed by Goebels' bicycle expert, Mr. Collins. See R. 6763 at Tr. 
373, 376-77. There was no hard object which could have caused these dents in the two-
seven and three-six gaps located between the rails which had been the focus of the 
litigation up to that point in time. Goebels1 accident reconstructionist concluded the 
pinch theory not to be viable and, in his opinion, a different gap was now the most likely 
cause of the accident. R. 6766 at Tr. 864-66. This previously unnoteworthy gap was to 
the east of the east rail between two field panels. It is the "gap" between pads number 
one and eight. See Addendum, Tabs 8 and 9. Goebels1 expert believed Mr. Goebel's 
front and rear tires and wheels "fell" into this particular gap and were channeled by the 
gap into the east rail which in his opinion produced the dents in the wheel rims and 
caused the accident. 
SLCSR's accident reconstruction expert, Mr. Woolley, concluded none of the gaps 
could have caused the accident. The dents in the front rim of Mr. Goebel's bicycle could 
not have resulted from being "channeled" by the subject one-eight gap into the eastern 
rail. The only precise measurements taken of the gap between panels one and eight while 
the crossing was still in place demonstrated that it was not wide enough to accommodate 
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Mr. Goebel's rim let alone the tires. See Addendum, Tab 11; R. 6767 at Tr. 1177-84, 
1199-2000, 1205; R. 6766 at Tr. 1026-27; and R. 6765 at Tr. 778, 805-06. Moreover, 
Mr. Woolley conducted experiments from which he concluded that the dents in the rims 
of Mr. Goebel's bicycle could only be produced if a man of Mr. Goebel's weight traveled 
at least twenty miles an hour into an abrupt height differential of over three inches. R. 
6766 at Tr. 992-1010, 1012-22. The tremendous amount offeree required to produce 
these dents was confirmed by Goebels' bicycle expert, Mr. Collins. See R. 6763 at Tr. 
373, 376-77. Even if Mr. Goebel's tires could have gone into the one-eight "gap," the 
height differential was not great enough because the gap was not long enough. Even if 
the one-eight "gap" were not filled with debris as it appears in Dfts. Ex. 1 (Addendum, 
Tab 11), the wheel of the bicycle, traveling twenty miles per hour, would traverse the 
entire twenty-one inch length of the seam before it could fall three inches. R. 6766 at Tr. 
1021-22, 1035-36. See also R. 6766 at Tr. 1036-37. In Mr. Woolley's opinion, the dent 
in the front rim was most likely caused by Mr. Goebel angling completely off of the 
crossing and striking the rail where the ties were exposed.1 
A directed verdict was granted by the trial court solely because after the close of 
all the evidence the trial court concluded that the Goebels had not submitted any 
evidence to prove that a gap even existed prior to the time of the accident in a condition 
1
 This conclusion was consistent with SLCSR's theory of the accident. Mr. Goebel was 
traveling faster on his new bicycle (see R. 6765 at Tr.664, 700) and there was bumper to 
bumper traffic to his left. R. 6762 at Tr. 134, 137, 143, 146, 1438. When he went to 
make his usual move to his left to avoid a protuberance in the roadway, he could not do 
so because of bumper to bumper vehicular traffic on his left. He thus had to go over the 
protuberance at too high of a speed or go to the right of it where the crossing ended. 
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that a reasonable man would think hazardous, let alone that it existed in such a condition 
for sufficient time for SLCSR to notice such a gap, perceive its danger and correct it. 
Goebels did not produce a single witness who claimed to have noticed any gap 
before the accident, let alone one who reported it or even thought it might be hazardous. 
To the contrary, every witness who had any reason to look for potential hazards at this 
crossing, including Mr. Goebel and other bicyclists, never saw any noteworthy gap. 
Moreover, even after the accident had occurred, the EMT who attended Mr. Goebel at 
the scene, Mrs. Goebel, her attorney, an investigator hired by her attorney, and the 
General Manager of SLCSR failed to note anything unusual or potentially hazardous 
about the one-eight gap claimed during the trial to be the gap which caused the accident. 
The following is a summary of the relevant testimony in this regard. 
John Martinez was the track inspector for SLCSR at the time of Mr. GoebeFs 
accident. He had worked from 1944 to 1974 for the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad and 
from 1974 to 1994 as a Federal Railroad Administration track inspector. R. 6067-68 at 
depo. pages 12-13. In addition to working as a federal track inspector for twenty years, 
he had been a track foreman, a track supervisor, a track assistant roadmaster and a 
roadmaster. Id. at 24. During his work as a track inspector for SLCSR, he fixed or 
directed others to fix anything he saw wrong with any crossing. Id. at 32. If he saw a 
rubber pad was loose, he would fix it. Id. at 32-35. He testified, " I was responsible for 
anything along that railroad track. That's why I fixed the crossings in Sandy and Draper 
. ..." Id- at 33, see also pages 36, 51 and 63-64. But " . . . I did not see anything on this 
-13-
[the 1700 South] crossing." Id. at 33-34, 37-38. "To me it was not dangerous." Id. at 
47. In his fifty years of railroad work he had never heard of a bicyclist being hurt by 
getting his tires stuck in a seam between crossing pads. Id- at 58-59. 
Denny Parry was a Railroad Safety Inspector for the Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT") R. 6767 at Tr. 1163. He had held that position for over ten 
years. Id. Prior to taking the job with UDOT, he had worked as track laborer, a track 
foreman, a track inspector and a track supervisor for the Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad. Id. at 1163. He had worked on and around railroad tracks since 1974. Id- In 
February of 1998, the month when Mr. Goebel's accident occurred, he inspected the 
track in question, including the crossing at 1700 South. Id. at 1164. He testified that 
when he inspected crossings as a State Inspector, he wanted to make sure there was 
nothing that would pose an unusual hazard to citizens of the State of Utah. Id. at 1166. 
He did not observe any gaps between the crossing pads that he thought posed any hazard 
to bicyclists. Id. at 1167. He also had never heard of a claim of a bicyclist being injured 
because his wheel went into a gap between crossing pads until Mr. Goebel's lawsuit. Id. 
at 1167. 
The Goebels called Mr. Felix Alires. At the time of the accident, he was the 
South District Manager and Accident Investigator for the Salt Lake City Street 
Department. R. 6763 at p. 287. He had held this position for ten years and 1700 South, 
where it crosses the subject tracks, was in his district. Id and 291. He testified that he is 
always on the lookout for possible hazards and he had no recollection of ever noting 
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anything wrong with the subject crossing (id. at 291) and no recollection of anyone 
calling in to even suggest any kind of hazard to bicyclists because of any gaps at that 
crossing. Id. 291-2. He also had never heard of a bicyclist being injured because his tire 
went into a gap at a railroad crossing. Id- at 293. 
Mr. Joseph Aquilar became the South District Manager for the Salt Lake City 
Street Department after Mr. Alires retired. R. 6763 at 296. He had worked for the Street 
Department steadily since 1979. Id. at 297. He went out to the crossing during its 
conversion to TRAX, long after the accident and after the rubber pads had been 
removed. The rubber pads had been replaced with concrete panels and, when he was 
there, the rubber-like grout filler had not be placed in the concrete seams. He thought 
those concrete seams presented a potential hazard. R. 6763 at 303. However, he had 
never noticed anything he thought hazardous about this crossing before the rubber pads 
were replaced with concrete as part of the TRAX construction. Id. at 308-9. He also had 
never heard of anyone calling in and complaining that this crossing was unsafe for 
bicyclists. Id. at 309. He too had never heard of a bicyclist being injured because his tire 
went into a gap in a railroad crossing. Id- at 310. 
Mr. Crosby Mecham was the manager of Facilities Design and Construction for 
the UTA. R. 6764 at p. 570. He was the "point man" for UTA with respect to the 
TRAX line that was being constructed. Id. at 577, R. 6765 at Tr. 601. Mr. Mecham 
testified that at the time of Mr. Goebel's accident, UTA owned the tracks that crossed 
1700 South at 250 West subject to SLCSR's easement to use them for freight service. R. 
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6765 at 605. He was involved in UTA's acquisition of this track and literally walked its 
entire length. Id. 607. He was asked if he could remember seeing any gaps between the 
rubber pads at any of the crossings that he thought might cause a problem for bicyclists 
and he answered, "No." Id. at 607. As UTA's point man for these tracks, he received 
complaints from citizens from time to time concerning UTA crossings but never did 
anyone "in any walk of life" call him and say that they thought there might be some 
problem for bicyclists because of gaps between the rubber pads at any of these crossings. 
Id- at 608. Until he learned of Mr. GoebePs accident, gaps at crossings as a problem for 
bicyclists had never crossed his mind. Id. at 608. He requested a subordinate, Jason 
Mumford, to survey all of the crossings on the UTA line. Id. Mr. Mumford's task was 
to inspect and report back to Mr. Mecham the condition of each of the crossings. Id. at 
609. Mr. Mumford's report was admitted into evidence as Ex. D-14. This exhibit 
showed that Mr. Mumford examined the crossing at 1700 South and 250 West, and even 
counted the number of rubber pads at this crossing. His assessment was that this 
crossing was in "good condition." Id. at 611. Mr. Mumford did not report any potential 
hazard to bicyclists and Mr. Mecham was aware of no one ever suggesting that there was 
anything wrong with this crossing that might affect the safety of bicyclists. Id. at 611-13. 
The paramedic who attended to Mr. Goebel, Jeffrey Clark, testified that as he 
approached Mr. Goebel he thought the tracks may have had something to do with the 
accident, but, even thinking this, he did not notice any gaps between the crossing pads. 
R. 6763 at 227, 236-7, 244. This despite the fact that he walked across the crossing 
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surface to get to Mr. Goebel. Id. at 239. 
SLCSR called David Miller as an expert in crossing maintenance. Mr. Miller was 
the Manager of Track Projects for the UP. He was responsible for track maintenance and 
safety for a five state area including Utah (R. 6762 at Tr. 96) and he had worked in the 
railroad industry since 1978. Id. His present duties included training and supervising UP 
personnel who inspect track and railroad crossings. Id. He expects the inspectors who 
work under him to look for anything at a crossing that would endanger anyone, including 
bicyclists (id- at 108-9) and if he saw something he thought posed an unreasonable 
danger to bicyclists on a UP track he would get it repaired immediately. Id. at 109. 
However, in over 20 years of railroad experience he had never heard of a bicyclist being 
injured because of a wheel getting into a gap in a crossing (id- 109 and 125) even though 
all crossings, whether rubber, wood or cement develop gaps in the seams over time. Id. 
104-5. Even though this crossing was previously owned by UP and was now in his 
territory (although no longer owned by UP) he had never heard of any complaint about 
gaps in the subject crossing before this lawsuit was filed. Id. at 109. He was shown 
several photographs of the subject crossing taken after the accident (Exhibits P-8, P-9, P-
10, P-l 1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5, P-8), including the photograph which shows Mrs. 
Goebel's finger in the gap between pads two and seven (Ex. P-l 1, included in 
Addendum, Tab 10). He was then asked whether he thought those photographs showed 
"anything wrong with that crossing." He answered, "No, I don't." Id. at 114 and 128-9. 
Then he was shown the only photograph anyone had taken before the crossing was 
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removed of the one-eight gap claimed at trial to be the cause of the accident. (Exhibit D-
1 included in Addendum, Tab 11.) He was then asked if he would take any exception to 
that gap and do anything to fix it. He answered, "No, I wouldn't." Id. at 115. 
Mr. Jay Jackson was the General Manager for SLCSR at the time of Mr. Goebel's 
accident. After he heard that Mr. Goebel claimed to have been injured at the 1700 South 
crossing because of a gap between the pads, he went to the crossing to inspect it. R. 
6765 at Tr. 623. Mr. Jackson couldn't find any gaps which could have posed a problem 
to bicyclists at this crossing. Id. at 623. On prior occasions, problems at other crossings 
had been reported and corrected. Id. at 629-30. Nobody, not SLCSR's regular track 
inspector, not any engineer or conductor, not anybody from UTA or SLC, nor any private 
citizen ever reported to him any problem for bicyclists due to gaps between the pads at 
any of SLCSR's crossings. Id. at 630, 636. He personally inspected the 1700 South 
crossing and noted no unusual hazard for bicyclists. Id. 631. 
A retired police officer, Jeff Ertel, hired by Goebels' counsel to investigate this 
accident, saw nothing remarkable about the one-eight gap. He went to the scene three 
different times in the month following the accident, once with Goebels' counsel R. 6762 
at Tr. 172-3. Despite knowing that this accident occurred and knowing that Goebels' 
counsel thought a gap between crossing pads caused the accident (id. at 173 and R. 6763 
at Tr. 190), Mr. Ertel didn't even bother to photograph the gap between pads one and 
eight. Id. at 201, 205. Goebels' counsel pointed Mr. Ertel to the wrong gap (the two-
seven gap) and that was the one he photographed. Id. at 174. Counsel and Mr. Ertel 
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focused upon gaps between pads two and seven and pads three and six. These were the 
gaps ruled out by Goebels' accident reconstruction expert, Mr. Ingebretsen, as being gaps 
which could have caused this accident. The gap between pads one and eight (shown in 
Exhibit D-l, Addendum, Tab 11) was the gap claimed at trial by Mr. Ingebretsen to be 
the cause of the accident. Mr. Ertel couldn't even remember discussing this gap while at 
the scene with Goebels' counsel. Id at 191. Mr. Ertel also recalls no discussion of a 
protuberance in the road. Id. at 193-4, 200, 207. Mr. Ertel prepared a report and a 
diagram to memorialize his investigation and in neither did he mention the subject (one-
eight) gap. Id. at 202-3 ? 
The Goebels called Charles Collins who was a self described bicycle enthusiast. 
This young man had been riding bicycles in Utah for fourteen years, logging between 
2500 and 8000 miles per year. R. 6763 at p. 333. He raced bicycles and organized 
bicycle races. In the two years before Mr. Goebel's accident, the common route he, and 
what he called the "bicycle racing community," (id. at 361) traveled was 1700 South to 
get to a training center west of the Salt Lake City Airport. Id. at 335-6. He either 
individually, or with a group of up to 30 other racers, traveled over the subject crossing 
2On one of Mr. Ertel's visits he made a video tape of the approach to the crossing from 
Mr. Goebel's perspective. The Goebels have taken a "freeze frame" from that tape and 
had it computer enhanced. This computer created image was admitted as Ex. P-10 and is 
included in the Goebels' addendum. Simple comparison of P-10 to the actual video tape 
demonstrates that the image has been enlarged and the definition enhanced which makes 
the edges of the gaps sharper and the contrast of shadow and light greater than the real 
image on the tape. This enhancement of a segment of video tape which unintentionally 
included the one-eight gap contrasts dramatically with that gap's appearance in Exhibit 
D-l, the only actual photograph of this gap. 
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approximately 100 times in the two years before Mr. Goebel's accident. Id. at 361. He 
was asked if he recalled ever noticing any gaps in the crossing surface at 1700 South and 
250 West and he answered, "No." Id- at 338. Mr. Collins noted that bicycle riders take 
due care when they approach railroad crossings. Id- at 360, 362. He acknowledged that 
he and those he was riding with looked for hazards and paid attention every time they 
crossed the railroad crossing at 1700 South and 250 West. He could not recall ever 
seeing any gaps at that crossing he thought to be a hazard to bicyclists. Id. 362-3. In 
fact, he could recall nothing at that crossing that he thought posed a hazard to bicyclists. 
Id. at 362. Moreover, no other bicyclists "in the bicycle racing community" ever stated 
in his presence that he or she perceived a potential hazard from any gaps in the crossing 
at 1700 South. Id. at 364. He also had never heard of a bicyclist being injured because 
his or her tire went into a seam between crossing pads. Id. at 361. 
Finally, Mr. Goebel was an experienced bicyclist. R. 6765 at Tr. 644-50. From 
April of 1997 until his accident the following February, he regularly commuted on his 
bicycle to his workplace at 1050 South 700 West from his home in Murray. Id. at 650-
61, 655-56. His regular route to and from work took him over the crossing at 1700 
South and 250 West. Id. at 656-59. He was aware of this crossing and had traveled over 
it a hundred times or more. Id. at 658, 695-96. He could not recall ever noticing any 
gaps at the railroad crossing. Id. at 659, 707-08. He did not recall seeing any gaps at the 
time of his accident or recall feeling the wheel of his bicycle go into any gap. Id- at 716. 
He had no idea as to how this accident happened until his wife suggested her gap theory 
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several days later. Id- at 716-17. Until then, the possibility that his front wheel went into 
a gap between the pads never crossed his mind. Id. at 718. When Mrs. Goebel told Mr. 
Goebel she thought a gap in the pads was a cause of his accident, she was talking about 
the gap between pads two and seven and three and six, not the one-eight gap claimed at 
trial to be the cause. Id. at 735. Mr. Goebel doesn't believe his wife even mentioned that 
gap and he believed it was more than a year after the suit was filed (actually two years) 
before anyone suggested to him that the one-eight gap might have had anything to do 
with his accident. Id. at 735-37. 
In summary, the railroad inspector responsible for this crossing did not perceive a 
hazard posed by any gap in the seams. Neither did the State of Utah track inspector. The 
UTA point man for the TRAX project walked this crossing and saw no hazard posed by 
any gaps. The person he sent to survey it noted no problem. SLC Street Department 
supervisors responsible for 1700 South observed no "gaps." No citizens complained to 
SLCSR, SLC, the UTA, or anyone else about any gaps in this crossing. Bicyclists, who 
probably are in the best position to look for and perceive potential bicycle hazards, 
regularly traveled over this crossing and they saw no dangerous gaps. Mr. Goebel recalls 
seeing no potentially hazardous gaps during the 100 times or more he went over this 
crossing each workday before the day of his accident. 
After people knew the accident occurred they either saw no noteworthy gaps (Mr. 
Clark and Mr. Jackson) or they completely ignored what Goebels claimed at trial to be 
the obviously hazardous gap that caused Mr. Goebel's accident (Mrs. Goebel, her 
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attorney and Mr. Ertel). It was this total lack of any notice of a potential hazard or even 
proof that a hazard existed that persuaded the trial court to grant a directed verdict. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Point I below, SLCSR argues that the directed verdict should be affirmed for 
the reason stated by the trial court. All of Goebels' claims against SLCSR required them 
to prove negligence including, in this case, SLCSR's actual or constructive knowledge of 
a dangerous condition before the accident and in time to have corrected it. The trial court 
correctly held that Goebels presented no such evidence as to notice and opportunity to 
remedy. Goebels' novel attempts to circumvent the need for such evidence also fail. 
In Point II, SLCSR addresses additional reasons to affirm the directed verdict. 
Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-7-26, § 10-7-29, § 56-1-11 and Salt Lake City 
Ordinance § 14.44.030, full and complete copies of which are included in the Addendum 
at Tabs 1-4, do not apply to SLCSR who does not own or operate UTA's "railroad." 
SLCSR asks that the Court rule on this issue even if it otherwise affirms the Judgment 
for SLCSR. As additional reasons to affirm the Judgment for SLCSR, this Court should 
hold that small gaps, like the gap alleged to have existed by Goebels, do not render a 
crossing unreasonably dangerous. Also, there was no evidence to prove that SLCSR 
could have foreseen such a small gap would be unreasonably dangerous to travelers who 
exercise ordinary care for their safety, or that the alleged gap actually caused Mr. 
Goebel's accident. 
In Point III, SLCSR addresses two other issues raised by Goebels, that do not 
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require reversal, on which Goebels desire rulings should this case be retried. One issue is 
an evidentiary ruling which has not been shown to have been an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. The other is the trial court's ruling that SLCSR owed no duty to the Goebels 
under SLCSR's agreement with UTA, pertaining to SLCSR's use of UTA's railroad for 
freight purposes, or under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 A, pertaining to voluntary 
undertakings. The agreement imposed no duty onto SLCSR and SLCSR never 
undertook any duty to remove small gaps from UTA's crossing surfaces. The trial 
court's rulings on these issues were correct.3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF A DIRECTED VERDICT 
WAS PROPER ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL. 
A. Actual Or Constructive Notice Of A Hazard And An Opportunity To 
Cure Must Be Proven In Order For There To Be A Legal Duty To 
Address An Existing Hazard. 
The Goebels' claims against SLCSR included negligence, public nuisance, and 
loss of consortium. All of these claims require proof of all the essential elements of 
negligence including, in this case, actual or constructive notice of the hazard. 
Goebels claim they can ignore this element under their public nuisance claim. An 
3
 An additional point needs to be made in response to Goebels5 brief. Goebels emphasize 
factual contentions that are unsupported by evidence and that are irrelevant. Goebels 
discuss the purported sentiments of the jurors, following the trial court's decision to grant 
the directed verdict, and they discuss Mr. Goebel's alleged medical condition after trial. 
Doing so is inappropriate. Contrary to Goebels' pitch that the trial court's ruling wasted 
Goebels' and the jurors' time, it is the Goebels who have caused SLCSR, the trial court 
and the jurors to incur unnecessary time and expenses by pursuing claims that are 
unsupportable under and contrary to the law. If the trial court contributed to the waste of 
resources it only was by not granting summary judgment before trial. 
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essential element of a public nuisance is "unreasonable" conduct, and "[c]onduct creating 
a nuisance which harms the plaintiff is unreasonable only where it is intentional, 
negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous." Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah 
App. 1994), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). Goebels admitted that "there is 
utterly no evidence to support the idea that the creation of the alleged public nuisance by 
any of the defendants was 'intentional,' 'reckless,' or 'ultrahazardous.'" R. 968. Thus, 
Goebels had to prove that SLCSR was negligent to satisfy the "unreasonable" conduct 
element of their public nuisance claim. 
In their Point VI.A.6., Goebels contend that "negligence" in the context of a 
public nuisance claim means something different than what it otherwise means in all 
other contexts because otherwise, Goebels reason, a public nuisance claim would be 
superfluous of a negligence claim. Thus, Goebels suggest, the inquiry under a public 
nuisance claim in this case is merely to find a "lack of concern." The problem with that 
position is it can't be shown that a defendant lacks concern unless that defendant has 
notice of the existing danger and then fails to have concern for it. The law can't go so 
far as to hold a defendant liable for merely not caring, in the abstract, about some 
possible hazard of which it has no actual or constructive knowledge. This Court should 
not follow Goebels' suggestion to have private liability under public nuisance law, when 
based on alleged negligent conduct, require less than a showing of negligence. Indeed 
the Erickson court was correct in upholding the body of law pertaining to negligence 
when holding that if a private claim for public nuisance is predicated on negligent 
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conduct, the inability to prove negligence is fatal to the public nuisance claim. 877 P.2d 
at 150. 
Mrs. Goebel's loss of consortium claim also requires proof of negligence. Under 
Utah law, loss of consortium is a derivative cause of action. A wife who allegedly lost 
marital services cannot recover if her husband does not have a viable cause of action. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-11(5). Accordingly, Mrs. Goebel's claim for loss of 
consortium depends on the viability of Mr. Goebel's negligence based claims. 
In this instance, Goebels had to prove notice and failure to remedy in order to 
prove negligence. "When a plaintiffs claim is based on the [defendant's] failure to 
repair rather than on affirmative negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing the 
[defendant] knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, a dangerous 
condition existed and the [defendant] had sufficient time to take corrective action." 
Klienert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Whether a 
defendant had notice and an opportunity to repair is "the essential inquiry relating to 
defendant's negligence." Martin v. Safeway Stores. Inc.. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Utah 
1977). See also Merino v. Albertsons. Inc.. 1999 UT 14, % 4-5, 975 P.2d 467,468-69; 
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light. 969 P.2d 403,407 (Utah 1998); Schnuphase v. 
Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476,478 (Utah 1996); Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. 
Inc.. 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); Long v. Smith Food King Store. 531 P.2d 360, 362 
(Utah 1973); Howard v. Auerbach Co.. 437 P.2d 895, 896 (Utah 1968); Malonev v. Salt 
Lake City. 262 P.2d 281. 282 (Utah 1953). 
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In the context of the duty to keep streets in repair, this Court has stated: 
To breach the duty . . . to make the street safe for travel, a [defendant] must 
have notice [of the alleged defect] and then must fail to respond within a 
reasonable time to repair the [defect]. As we stated in Schnuphase v. Storehouse 
Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996): 
"'[F]ault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results 
therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the 
condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge 
because the condition had existed long enough that he should have 
discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed 
that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it.'" 
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light. 969 P.2d 403, 407 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) (quoting 
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc.. 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975)). In Fishbaugh. the 
plaintiff, who was struck by a car in a crosswalk, alleged that SLC and Utah Power & 
Light were negligent for failing to maintain streetlights. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City and UP&L because 
even assuming . . . that UP&L had notice of the outage at some time prior to the 
accident, there is no evidence indicating how long UP&L had such notice. 
Without any evidence to that effect, [plaintiff] cannot prove that the City and 
UP&L failed to repair the streetlights within a reasonable time after receiving 
notice and that they were thus negligent in maintaining the streetlights. 
Id at 408. 
In Malonev v. Salt Lake City. 262 P.2d 281 (Utah 1953), the sidewalk plaintiff 
had regularly walked on collapsed, and he sued SLC for negligent maintenance. In 
affirming a directed verdict for the City, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to 
show that the sidewalk's poor condition had existed for a sufficient amount of time to 
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give the City notice of it and repair it, particularly where the plaintiff himself had used 
the sidewalk before the accident and noticed no defects: "In this respect we think 
[plaintiffs] evidence fails to support a finding in his favor. [Plaintiff], himself could not 
state that the sidewalk was in a defective condition before the accident, although he had 
previously used the sidewalk in question many times." IdL at 282 (emphasis added). 
The same rule has been applied in cases in which plaintiffs allege defects on 
railroad crossing surfaces. See, Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. 
Wright, 549 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Ky. 1976)(no proof that the railroad company had notice 
of the condition, or that the condition could have been discovered in the exercise of 
reasonable care); Bentz v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 184 So. 448, 448 (Miss. 1938) 
(affirming directed verdict for defendant railroad charged with failing to correct a 2V2" to 
3" tripping hazard at railroad crossing where "the traveling public, among whom was the 
plaintiff, had passed over the road frequently, and no one had noticed the presence of this 
projecting rock"); Liddle v. Thompson, 162 S.W.2d 614, 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942) 
(reversing verdict for plaintiff, injured due to uneven and protruding railroad crossing 
planks, because there was no proof "that the defendant either had actual or constructive 
notice of the defect within time to make repairs before the time of an accident alleged to 
have been occasioned thereby"). 
B. No Evidence Was Presented During Trial Of Actual or 
Constructive Notice To SLCSR Of Any Potential Danger From 
The Subject Gap. 
Goebels presented no evidence that the alleged gap was hazardous before the 
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accident or that SLCSR had notice of and an opportunity to remedy its condition. To the 
contrary, none of the many individuals who inspected the crossing shortly before Mr. 
GoebePs accident noticed any gap, and those who inspected the crossing after the 
accident never thought the one-eight gap would pose any hazard. Critically, like the 
plaintiff in Maloney v. Salt Lake City, Mr. Goebel himself could not state that the 
crossing was defective before his accident, and he had ridden his bicycle over it almost 
daily for nearly a year before the accident, including the day before the accident. In 
addition, Goebels could not prove what the supposedly hazardous gap looked like before 
the accident - not only how wide it was but whether or not it was filled with debris. What 
should SLCSR have seen when it regularly inspected this crossing.? It is telling that 
nowhere in their brief do Goebels try to marshal evidence of record to support this 
element of their claims. All evidence was contrary to any finding that SLCSR knew or 
should have known a hazard existed in time to repair it. 
To counter all the evidence against them, Goebels merely argue in their Point 
VI.A.4. that SLCSR's knowledge of the allegedly hazardous gap can be presumed, 
contrary to the evidence, because the gap was "permanent." When large rubber pads are 
placed together to form a crossing there always will be seams. However, when does a 
seam become wide or deep enough to be called a "gap?" Also, not every gap can 
accommodate a bicycle tire, and in fact very few can according to Goebels5 own 
argument that generally gaps do not get bigger than 3/4". Goebels' brief at 25. 
The essence of Goebels argument is that once a gap of any size is seen, or is 
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discoverable, although not yet dangerous, it should be removed so it never has a chance 
to become dangerous. However, Goebels are wrong in implying that all gaps are in a 
permanent dangerous condition or will become dangerous. There was no evidence that 
SLCSR was on notice of any gap or that the gap, assuming one existed, was going to 
become dangerous before UTA refurbished that crossing for its TRAX line or before the 
accident. Goebels' argument should be rejected because it would require the removal of 
all gaps, even razor thin gaps, simply because they may become dangerous. Goebels' 
sole authority, a 1895 Pennsylvania case, does not support that position. In that case, 
there was evidence of the existing hazard in the worn rail and that the hazard "was 
apparent and the danger probable" before the accident. Gitton v. Heston, Montana & 
Fairmount Passenger Ry., 31 A. 249, 250 (Pa. 1895). That court stated that knowledge 
that a hazard may exist from wear and tear creates a duty to inspect, not a duty to replace 
before the hazard exists. Id. There is no evidence that the subject gap had reached the 
critical point of being recognized as wide and deep enough to be dangerous, or that it 
was known that it ever would reach that point, before the time of the accident or the 
replacement of the entire crossing by UTA. Thus, Goebels' attempt to circumvent the 
need for evidence of notice and opportunity to correct should be rejected. 
Similarly, Goebels also contend in their Point VI.A.5. that it does not matter that 
no one noticed the alleged gap because the jury can infer from the fact that some seam 
exists that a gap existed for a long time and that SLCSR should have noticed it as 
presenting a hazard before the accident. However, there was no evidence of any gap 
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prior to the accident, no record and no public complaint of a gap, and no witness saw a 
gap, including Goebels' bicycle expert, Charles Collins, and Mr. Goebel himself, both of 
whom had been riding bicycles over that crossing numerous times immediately before 
Mr. Goebel's accident. It cannot reasonably be inferred both that a gap existed and that it 
had become wide and deep enough to present a hazard simply because some kind of 
seam always must exist between the panels or pads. Indeed a seam or gap cannot be a 
hazard to bicyclists if bicycle tires can't fit into it. In arguing that Mr. Goebel's and his 
bicycle expert's failure to see any hazard is not important, Goebels ignore that Mr. 
Goebel and his bicycle expert clearly had a duty to travel at appropriate speeds to observe 
and avoid potential roadway hazards. No one is better able to appreciate a potential 
hazard to bicyclists than bicyclists. The fact that they admit to not seeing any hazard 
before Mr. Goebel's accident is extremely significant. Goebels merely assume contrary 
to the evidence, that there was a gap and that it was obviously dangerous for long period 
of time. 
Also, the undisputed evidence was that gaps can form quickly, as well as over 
time. The photographs of the eight pads in question show they have been violently 
struck at some time by snow plows or something else. See the scrape marks which 
appear on the pads in Exhibit D-4 and Exhibit P-l 1, Addendum, Tabs 9 and 10. Also, 
there was evidence that gaps that form over time generally become filled with debris. 
There was no evidence as to whether a street sweeper or a storm could or did clean out 
any debris in the one-eight gap. Consequently, not only is there no evidence upon which 
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a jury reasonably could conclude the subject gap was wide enough and deep enough to 
be dangerous for a sufficient period of time to have ben recognized as dangerous and 
corrected, but any reasonable inference from the actual evidence is to the contrary. 
Goebels, therefore, could not and did not prove that SLCSR had actual or constructive 
notice of the alleged dangerous gap. 
C. A "Protuberance" In The Asphalt Does Not Negate The Need To 
Prove Notice Of The Allegedly Existing Hazardous Gap. 
In an attempt to circumvent their inability to prove prior notice of the allegedly 
hazardous gap, Goebels argue in their Point VI.A.2. that SLCSR should have known of 
what they call a "protuberance" in the asphalt east of the alleged one-eight gap existed. 
It must first be noted that the condition of 1700 South beyond the crossing is the 
responsibility of Salt Lake City. Even more importantly, it is conceded by Goebels that 
the protuberance did not cause Mr. Goebel to fall. Indeed Mr. Goebel testified that he 
steered around it. Because there is no cause in fact, the trial court ruled as a matter of 
law that the alleged protuberance cannot be a proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's accident. 
R. 6761 at Tr. 8-9. The trial court was correct. R. 6761 at Tr. 8-9. Since the 
protuberance did not cause Mr. Goebel to fall, it cannot be concluded that "but for" the 
protuberance Mr. Goebel would not have fallen. Why Mr. Goebel actually fell was never 
proven. However, it is certain that he could have steered his bicycle into a dangerous 
gap, if one existed, with or without any protuberance. He also could have steered his 
bicycle to avoid any dangerous gap, regardless of the existence of any protuberance, just 
as he successfully steered around the protuberance on a hundred prior occasions. The 
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protuberance is no more a cause of Mr. Goebel's accident than the fact that Mr. Goebel 
chose to ride his bicycle rather than walk or drive. 
D. Statute And Ordinance Based Law Does Not Impose Liability Without 
Negligence Onto Railroads, For Allowing Small Gaps In Their 
Crossings. 
Goebels also attempt to turn their negligence claims into some kind of strict 
liability claim by arguing in their sections VI.A.3. and VLB. that UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-
7-26(2), § 10-7-29, § 56-1-11 and Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14-44.030 allow them to 
recover from SLCSR without proving actual or constructive notice of a dangerous 
condition. The trial court ruled that SLCSR owed a duty of reasonable care under these 
provisions, because of its use of its easement over UTA's tracks, and that the notice 
requirement applies to SLCSR's duty thereunder. R. 6668-6670. Goebels argue that 
these statutes and the ordinance do not discuss a notice element, and, therefore, provide 
them an absolute right to recover damages from SLCSR without proof of notice. 
Goebels are wrong. In addition to requiring at least notice of a hazard, they are 
inapplicable. 
These provisions do not apply to SLCSR because SLCSR is not a "railway 
company" or "railroad company'5 within the meaning of these statutes and ordinances. 
This point is discussed in Points II.A. and III.B., infra. 
In addition, even assuming they do apply to SLCSR, these provisions are 
inapplicable on their face inasmuch as they do not purport to require owners of railroads 
to do anything without prior notice, or to specifically eliminate less than one inch wide 
-32-
gaps in crossing surface materials. Sections 10-7-26 and 10-7-29 pertain to the powers 
of cities. Section 10-7-26(2) only states that it does not exempt any railway company's 
otherwise existing duty, if any, to keep a crossing in a good and safe condition. It does 
not impose such a duty. It only imposes the duty to plank, pave, macadamize or do 
whatever else to the crossing surface "as the governing body of the city . . . may from 
time to time direct." In other words, to do what the railway is directed by the city to do. 
Being "directed" to act requires a showing of much more than merely having notice of a 
hazard. The city ordinance also pertains only to what the city requires railroad owners to 
do within the city. Also, Section 10-7-29 only requires railroads to pave or repave their 
crossing surfaces when the city paves or repaves its street, and to keep such pavement in 
proper repair using whatever material "the governing body of the city may require and 
order," and also to not "neglect" to keep their "tracks" in repair. There is no evidence 
SLC ever required SLCSR to do anything, let alone more than what the track owners, UP 
and then UTA, had done, or specifically to eliminate any gaps in between the rubber 
panels. Neither SLC nor these provisions require the elimination of all gaps, no matter 
how small. These provisions do nothing to impose a duty on SLCSR to do what Goebels 
claim it should have done. 
Moreover, these statutes, like the ordinance, exist only to allow cities, in this case 
SLC, to control the conditions of their streets by being authorized to direct railroad 
companies with respect to crossing surfaces and also being able to recover from railroad 
companies the expenses incurred should any city act to maintain any crossing surface 
-33-
itself when the responsible railroad company did not do as directed by the city. These 
provisions do not provide private causes of action. 
Sections 56-1-11 and 10-7-29 also do not impose strict liability on railroads. 
Section 56-1-11 provides that companies who own or operate railroads (tracks) will be 
liable for damages caused by their "neglect to make and maintain good and sufficient 
crossings." Section 10-7-29 is violated only "by reason of neglect to keep . . . tracks in 
repair." These statutes do not specifically prohibit small gaps, and they do not require 
perfectly smooth crossings. A crossing is good and sufficient if it has inconsequential 
gaps. Moreover, both statutes require the proscribed condition to result from the railroad 
owner's "neglect." Synonyms for"neglect" are "disregard" and "ignore." See Webster's 
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 791 (1988). These terms all suggest some level of 
scienter, the actual intent not to do something for a substantial period of time. Contrary 
to Goebels' suggestion, "neglect" is not some level of wrongdoing that is less culpable 
than negligence. At a minimum, one would have to be negligent in order to violate a 
statute that requires "neglect." More importantly, one cannot neglect, ignore or disregard 
something of which he or she is unaware. Notice of the defective crossing condition 
remains an element and these statutes do not provide a cause of action where common 
law negligence does not. 
Goebels' mistake is revealed clearly in the authority upon which they rely. In 
York v. Pennsylvania RR Co.. 56 N.E.2d 341 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943), a case with very 
limited subsequent citation only within Ohio, the court was faced with a statute that 
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provided, as described by the court, "that a railroad company shall maintain . . . safe and 
sufficient crossings and such company shall be liable for all damages sustained . . . by 
reason of the want or insufficiency of such crossing." Id- at 344 (emphasis added). That 
court held that notice was not necessary because the statute before it imposed absolute 
liability. Similarly, in Moreland v. Directors General of Railroads,! 14 A. 424, 425 (N.J. 
1921), the parties agreed that the particular New Jersey statute at issue in that case 
imposed an absolute duty to "keep in repair." In Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Rv 
v. Red, 47 111. App. 662 (111. 1893) notice was not an issue inasmuch as "[i]t was shown 
that this crossing had been out of order for nearly a month." Id. at 664. The statutes and 
ordinance cited in the case at bar do not impose strict liability or absolute duties, without 
notice. 
In addition to these old cases from other states construing different statutes, 
Goebels also cite a Utah case that discusses § 56-1-1 lfs predecessor. This Utah case 
undermines Goebels's position. In Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co.,171 P. 999 (Utah 
1918), the court made a point of stating that the evidence was sufficient to prove the 
crossing was dangerous and unsafe "for a long time." 171 P. at 1002. Indeed, the court 
stated in dicta that it would be proper to instruct the jury that it should consider the 
surrounding circumstances in determining whether the statute was violated. This, of 
course, means that a railroad owner also has to be aware of the circumstances to be able 
to comply with the duty imposed by the statute. Id. No Utah case is known to hold that 
§ 56-1-11, or any other Utah statute or ordinance, imposes an absolute duty to correct 
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hazards without notice of the circumstances, including whether there is an existing 
hazard. Goebels contend Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific RR Co., 186 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1947), does not expressly require notice, but that is because that issue was not before the 
court. Neither does that case hold notice is not required. Like Denkers, the Van 
Wagoner court simply upheld a jury instruction that stated a "good and sufficient" 
crossing is one that is ordinarily safe under the circumstances. Id- at 305. 
II. SLCSR'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED FOR OTHER REASONS. 
A. The Statutes And City Ordinance Relied Upon To Impose Certain 
Duties Regarding Maintenance Of Railroad Crossings Are Not 
Applicable To SLCSR Who Did Not Own Or Operate The "Railroad." 
The trial court has ruled in dicta that the duties imposed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 
10-7-26, § 10-7-29, § 56-1-11 and Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030 upon the 
owners and operators of "railroads" applied in this case to SLCSR. The trial court erred 
in that ruling, and SLCSR asks that the Court reverse that ruling, even if it otherwise 
affirms the Judgment for SLCSR. 
A "railway company" is a company that "owns or operates railway tracks," § 10-
7-26(1), or that owns or operates a "railway," § 10-7-29. (Emphasis added.) SLCSR 
does not own or operate a railway; it only operates trains over UTA's railway for freight 
service purposes. For the purpose of these provisions, a "railway" is a roadway with 
rails. The ownership of a "railroad" is not defined by the ownership or use of 
locomotives or rolling stock. An entity may own a "railroad" (the tracks) without 
owning any railroad equipment or an entity may have the right to use some other entity's 
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"railroad" (such as Amtrak operating trains over UP tracks) without becoming the entity 
responsible for the statutory obligations concerning crossings. In this case, UTA owned 
and operated (controlled access to) the tracks where they crossed 1700 South. SLCSR's 
freight service easement was merely a grant of limited access to use UTA's railroad. It 
did not make SLCSR an owner or operator of the tracks so as to make any statutory 
duties to maintain crossings for bicyclists or others applicable to SLCSR. It only makes 
sense that inasmuch as these provisions pertain to real property, that the owners or those 
who control the use of the property (lessees), should have the obligations concerning 
what is done with the property. 
B. As A Matter Of Public Policy, SLCSR Could Not Have A Legal Duty 
To Make UTA's Crossing Surface So Smooth That There Would Be 
No Gap Wide Enough To Accommodate Any Bicycle Tire. 
Railroads are not required to keep crossing surfaces absolutely safe for bicyclists. 
All roadways need only be kept "'in a reasonably safe condition for travel.'" Braithwaite 
v. West Valley City Corp.. 921 P.2d 997, 998 (Utah 1996) (quoting Braithwaite v. West 
Valley City Corp.. 860 P.2d 336, 338 (Utah 1993)). See also. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power 
& Light. 969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998). Moreover, streets need not be kept reasonably 
safe for all travelers, but only for those "exercising due care for their own safety." 
Pollari v. Salt Lake City. 176 P.2d 111,116 (Utah 1947) (emphasis added). 
[T]he owner of property is not to be regarded as an insurer for even an invitee 
upon his property. His duties toward invitees are limited [to] those risks which 
are unreasonable, which he has no reason to believe such persons will discover or 
realize the risk involved, and which he has reason to anticipate that persons acting 
with ordinary and reasonable care will encounter. 
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Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 396 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1964) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added): see English v. Kienke. 848 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah 
1993) (possessor of land has duty to protect invitee against only the hazards "which the 
possessor should expect the invitee will not discover or realize"). Also, a defendant is 
not obligated to correct an alleged defect when doing so "would . . . reduce the likelihood 
of injury so minimally that to impose the duty would be unduly burdensome." Slisze v. 
Stanley-Bostich. 1999 UT 20, H 13, 979 P.2d 317, 320. 
There are scores of cases in which roadways with defects of the type Goebels 
allege have been found to be reasonably safe as a matter of law. For example, Hindman 
v. State Department of Highways and Public Transp., 906 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1994), involved a bicycle accident in which the bicyclist hit a 214" tall bump on the 
shoulder of a street. In affirming summary judgement for the defendant, the court stated, 
minor flaws in road shoulders are neither unexpected nor unusual, and, though 
[plaintiff], as a cyclist, had a perfect right to be traveling on the shoulder rather 
than the main road, imperfections such as the one he encountered on this occasion 
are conditions that cyclists can and should anticipate when riding on a shoulder. 
Id. at 45 (emphasis added).5 Many of these courts base their holdings on the significant 
expense involved in guarding against injury caused by such slight imperfections: 
5
 See also Ursino v. Big Bov Restaurants of America, 237 Cal. Rptr. 413,415 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1987); Birckv. Citvof Ouincv. 608 N.E.2d 920, 924-25 (111. Ct. App. 1993); New 
York Central R.R. Co. v. SholL 146 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 1957); Barnett-
Holdgraf v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York. 3 P.3d 89, 90, 94 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000); 
Orleans Parish School Bd. v. City of New Orleans. 585 So. 2d 643, 647 (La. Ct. App. 
1991); Kinchen v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 114, 119 (La. Ct. App. 1967); 
Buffington v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co.. 188 So. 563, 563 (Miss. 1939); Brooks v. New York 
State ThruwavAuth.. 423 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). 
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The size of the defect could change with the temperature, with the seasons, and 
from year to year, and it would be a virtually impossible burden to place on a 
municipality to inspect and repair hundreds of miles of [travel surfaces]. Common 
sense would dictate that the economic burden placed on a municipality for such an 
undertaking would be significant. Birck v. City of Quincy, 608 N.E.2d 920, 923 
(IU.Ct.App. 1993). 
The costs involved are "outrageously high" where the risk of harm was 
only slight to begin with: "The State has thousands of miles of roadways 
which have great utility value and are vital to the public. The cost to repair 
every pothole or minor crack would be outrageously high. The probability 
and gravity of harm posed by [such] defect[s]... is insignificant." Orleans 
v. Parish School Bd.. 585 So. 2d at 647. 
Before Mr. Goebel's accident, no one familiar with railroad crossings had ever 
heard of a bicycle accident involving such gaps in crossing surfaces. Moreover, the 
subject crossing was commonly used by bicyclists before and after Mr. Goebel's accident 
without incident or complaint. As stated in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Wright 126 
S.W.2d 609, 613 (Ark. 1939), there can be no better proof on the issue of whether the 
crossing was in a reasonably safe condition for the ordinary use of the traveling public 
than that it was frequently used without incident. As a matter of public policy, the 
burden of preventing accidents from small gaps in seams at railroad crossings, should be 
placed on bicyclists where it most reasonably belongs. See City of Knoxville v. Cooper, 
265 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953). Not only is such a simple precaution by 
bicyclists a matter of common sense, it is mandated by applicable law, as discussed 
further in subsection C. below. 
C. There Was No Evidence Presented To Prove That This Accident Was 
Reasonably Foreseeable Even With Notice Of The Alleged Gap. 
"The existence of a duty of reasonable care depends in part on the extent to 
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which a reasonable person can foresee that his acts may create a significant likelihood of 
causing harm to others.'" AMS Salt Indus.. Inc.. 942 P.2d at 321 (quoting Cruz v. 
Middlecauff Lincoln-Mercury, 909 P.2d 12525 1258 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, Assoc. C.J., 
concurring)); Slisze v. Stanlev-Bostitch. 1999 UT 20, f 11-12, 979 P.2d 317, 320. As 
the United States Supreme Court explained: 
It has been well said that, "if men went about to guard themselves against every 
risk to themselves or others which might by ingenious conjecture be conceived as 
possible, human affairs could not be carried on at all. The reasonable man, then, 
to whose ideal behavior we are to look as the standard of duty, will neither neglect 
what he can forecast as probable, nor waste his anxiety on events that are barely 
possible. He will order his precaution by the measure of what appears likely in the 
known course of things." 
Atchison. Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U.S. 1, 9 (1909) (quoting Pollock, 
Torts 41 (8th ed.)). Also, "in [deciding] whether the defendant should have been expected 
to take further precautions to avoid injury . . ., it is only fair and proper to make that 
determination from the standpoint of foresight and not hindsight." Long v. Smith Food 
King. 531 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973). 
In this case, it was not reasonably foreseeable to SLCSR or anyone else that gaps 
like the gap in this case would cause a bicycle accident. Every single witness in this case 
who was familiar with railroad crossings, testified that while small gaps in railroad 
crossings are common, they had never heard or even conceived of a bicycle accident 
involving a small gap between crossing panels. Indeed, it was far from proven that this 
accident was caused by any gap between crossing panels. 
A ruling that SLCSR had a duty to remedy the alleged gap in the subject crossing 
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also would require a finding that SLCSR should have foreseen that Mr. Goebel would 
ignore his obligation to exercise care for his own safety. For his accident to have 
occurred as Goebels allege, Mr. Goebel would have had to break applicable law 
requiring him to keep a lookout and ride slow enough to see and avoid observable 
surface hazards. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-46(l)(a), § 41-6-84(1) and Salt Lake City 
Ordinance § 12.36.010. See also Solt v. Godfrey. 479 P.2d 474, 475-476 (Utah 1971); 
McAllister v. Bvbee, 425 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1967); Mingus v. Olsson. 201 P.2d 495, 
499 (Utah 1949). The gap Goebels allege caused Mr. Goebel's accident was not hidden; 
it was just as observable to Mr. Goebel as Goebels claim it was to SLCSR. 
Goebels must prove that an accident involving the alleged gap was reasonably 
foreseeable, not merely possible.6 Because Goebels had no evidence to satisfy this 
burden, their claims against SLCSR should have been dismissed. 
D. There Was No Evidence To Prove That The Alleged Gap In Fact 
Existed To A Width, Depth And Length That Mr. Goebel's Bicycle 
Tires Could Fit Into It. 
Even assuming SLCSR had a duty with respect to UTA's crossing surfaces to 
reduce gaps which are wide enough to accommodate bicycle tires, Goebels have no 
evidence that SLCSR breached that duty as to the subject gap. No one noticed a gap in 
the crossing before Mr. Goebel's accident. As the witnesses familiar with railroad 
6
 See Knoxville v. Cooper, 265 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. App. 1953); Alabama Great SLCSR 
R. Co. v. Bishop, 68 So. 2d 530, 532-33 (Ala. 1953); Bowie v. Missouri Pacific R.R. 
Co,, 561 S.W.2d314,316(Ark. 1978): Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Richardson. 47 
S.W.2d 794, 795 (Ark. 1932); Humphrey v. City of Pes Moines, 20 N.W.2d 25, 28 
(Iowa 1945). 
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crossings testified, a gap can form "very quickly" and "all at once," including by 
"vehicles impacting directly on a crossing surface" and "dragging equipment on the 
railroad or snowplows on the highway side." R. 2545-2548, 2557 (p. 46); 2557 (p. 54), 
2558 (p.57) - 2560, 2563-2564, 2566; see also R. 2178-2179, 2181, 2196. In this case, 
some of the pads in question clearly have been violently struck by snow plows or 
something else. See the scrape marks apparent on the pads in Exhibits D-4 and P-l 1, 
Addendum at Tabs 9 and 10. In addition, gaps most often are filled with debris. Thus, 
the subject gap could have been created after Mr. GoebePs accident, or filled with debris 
before the day of the accident. 
GoebePs expert testified that the subject one-eight gap was "hour-glass" shaped, 
being widest at the ends. R. 6766 at Tr. 822, 900-01; Pltfs' Ex. 62. After the accident, 
the ends were measured only twice before the crossing was removed. In March, they 
were measured to be 3/4" at both ends, and, in July, they were measured to be .812" at 
the east end and .698" at the west end. R. 6767 at Tr. 1175-84. The east end of the gap 
was larger and the west end smaller than when measured in March, but the July 
measurements were with a more precise instrument, and the differences were within the 
margin of error. Thus, there may have been no actual difference in the size of the gap 
when measured at the ends in March and July. In July, the one-eight gap was measured 
in between the ends at two inch increments. Starting from the East end of the gap the 
measurements were: .812", .725", .600", .498", .563", .587", .592", .604", .645", .670" 
and .698". See R. 6767 at Tr. 1181-1183 and Ex. D-1 and P-62. Except for the first two 
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inches at the east end of the gap, all these measurements demonstrate the gap to be too 
narrow to accommodate Mr. Goebel's .724" wide rim. See R. 6765 at Tr. 778, 805-06; 
6766 at Tr. 900-01; Pltf.'s Ex. 62. 
Even plaintiffs' expert Mr. Ingebretsen opined that Mr. Goebel's wheel could not 
have fit into a gap unless it was .725" or wider. He also testified that the wheel had to 
travel the full 21" length of the one-eight gap, at the 22-30 feet per second Mr. Goebel 
was traveling, to be able to have time to fall far enough to make the impact with the rail 
significant.7 R. 6766 at Tr. 825-26, 867-74, 902-03, 937-47. 
E. There Was No Evidence To Prove That The Alleged Gap, 
Assuming It Existed, Was The Cause Of Mr. Goebel's Accident 
Goebels also must prove that SLCSR's alleged breach of duty caused Mr. 
Goebel's accident. "In every case, negligence and proximate cause are 'separate and 
distinct factors in assigning tort liability.' Proof of negligence is never 'enough by itself 
to establish liability; it must also be proved that negligence was a cause of the event 
which produced the injury or harm sustained by the one who brings the complaint.'" 
Holmstrom v. C.R. England. Inc.. 2000 UT App. 239, ^ 32, 8 P.3d 281, 290 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 438 (1989)). See also, Weber v. 
Springville City. 725 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Utah 1986). To satisfy their burden, Goebels 
must prove that SLCSR's alleged negligence-failing to reduce the width of the alleged 
gap in the subject crossing-"played a substantial role in causing the injuries." 2000 UT 
7SLCSR's expert believed the 21 inch length was not long enough because the wheel 
would have to fall at least 3 inches before it struck the rail to produce the observed dent 
in the front rim. See page 11 and 12, supra. 
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App. 239, If 36,1| 45; see Mitchell v. Pearson Enter.. 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985). 
Goebels can satisfy their burden only with "direct evidence," not conjecture or 
speculation. Mitchell. 697 P.2d at 246. See also. Mahmood v. Ross. 1999 UT 104, % 23, 
990 P.2d 933, 938; Bansasine v. Bodell. 927 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments. Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
McAllister v. Bvbee. 425 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1967). 
For the reasons discussed above in Point H.E., Goebels clearly cannot prove the 
subject gap at issue caused Mr. Goebel's accident. The incontrovertible physical 
evidence, the width and length of that gap, precludes that finding. However, even 
without the physical evidence, assuming the gap was wide and long enough, Goebels still 
cannot prove causation. There is not a scintilla of evidence to support this speculation. 
No witness, including Mr. Goebel, has testified that Mr. Goebel's tires went into any 
"gap" between the crossing panels. After the accident, every witness who went to the 
crossing to try to surmise what happened failed to conclude the subject one-eight gap 
could have been the cause. 
The speculation that Mr. Goebel's tires became trapped in a gap between the pads 
has its genesis in Mrs. Goebel's imagination. Two or three days after the accident, she 
went to the scene and deduced that Mr. Goebel's front tire became trapped in the seam 
between panels two and seven and three and six. For over a year, it was Goebels' claim 
that the bicycle wheels became wedged in that particular gap - not that they were 
channeled along a different 21" long gap into a rail. Later, Goebels' expert ruled out the 
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gap Mrs. Goebel identified because the damage to Mr. Goebel's front tire is inconsistent 
with it having been "wedged" between the pads. Goebels now surmise that the front tire 
had to have struck an object at the end of the gap, like a rail, and there was simply no 
such object at the end of the gap Mrs. Goebel believed was the cause of the accident.. 
In sum, one may speculate as to any number of theories as to how this accident 
happened. Because there was an unusual amount of bumper to bumper traffic to his left 
and he was traveling too fast to go over the protuberance, Mr. Goebel may have angled 
off the crossing to the north (his right) as SLCSR's expert, Mr. Woolley, concluded. He 
may have simply struck an object (rock, brick, cement block, piece of iron) that was later 
moved out of the way. He could have simply turned too sharply into the flange way or 
lost control. All such theories, including Goebels1 initial and latest trial theories, are at 
best theories. There is no direct evidence that a gap caused this accident. There is only 
speculation and conjecture.8 
III. THE COURT SHOULD NOT OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
OTHER RULINGS FOR WHICH GOEBELS DO NOT CLAIM REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Excluding Evidence 
Of Testing Done At A Different Crossing, With Respect To A Different Gap Under 
8
 See also Foster v. New York Cent. Sys.. 402 F.2d 312, 313-14 (7th Cir. 1968); 
Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Wright 126 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Ark. 1939); Castellaw v. 
Pollard. 183 S.E. 927, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936): Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Craig. 219 
S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948); Arceneaux v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 12 
So. 2d 733, 736 (La. Ct. App. 1943): Mississippi Export R.R. Co. v. Miller. 193 So. 2d 
134, 136-137 (Miss. 1966); Buffmgton v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co.. 188 So. 563, 563 (Miss. 
1939); Brooks v. New York State Thruwav Auth.. 423 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1979); Keirstead v. City of New York, 260 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1965); Foreman v. Chicago. R. I & P. Rv. Co.. 74 P.2d 350, 352 (Okla. 1937). 
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Different Conditions When Offered To Support The Proposition Of Whether Mr. 
Goebel's Bicycle Tires Actually Could Fit Into The Specific Alleged Gap, Whatever 
Size It Was, On The Day Of The Accident. 
What Goebels complain about in their Point VLB. is that the trial court would not 
let Mr. Ingebretsen testify about his efforts to get a bicycle tire into a different gap at a 
different crossing under different circumstances, with different widths along the gap, as 
support for his opinion that Mr. Goebel's tire could fit into the subject gap. The crossing 
Mr. Ingebretsen used was owned by UP and was in a state of repair much worse than the 
1700 South crossing. The trial court exercised its discretion not to allow testimony and 
photographs concerning that crossing because it was unduly prejudicial and potentially 
misleading. R. 6766 at Tr. 848-849. Mr. Ingebretsen was allowed to opine that the tire 
and wheel would fit into any gap wider than .724 inches. 
Goebels argue to this Court, as they did to the trial court, that evidence of 
experiments at a different crossing would not be misleading and would assist the trier of 
fact, but Goebels do not attempt to meet their burden of showing that the trial court's 
discretionary ruling under the circumstances at the time was so unreasonable that it 
should be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of its broad discretion. 
See Gerbich v. Numed. Inc.. 1999 UT 37, ^ 16, 977 P.2d 1205; A.K. & R Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr.. 1999 UT App. 87, % 11, 977 P.2d 518. Goebels 
cannot prevail on this point by simply rearguing here the position on which they lost 
below. They must show how the trial court abused its discretion other than merely 
stating that they believe its decision was wrong. 
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Moreover, Goebels do not even attempt to explain how the trial court is wrong by 
showing how the excluded testimony would assist the jury or not be misleading. SLCSR 
should not be expected to argue this point in a vacuum, and therefore simply is left to 
refer this Court to its argument made to the trial court at R. 6766 (Tr. 840-849), should 
this Court choose to reconsider that issue and make its own evidentiary ruling. 
B. SLCSR DID NOT ASSUME UTA'S DUTY TO MAINTAIN UTA'S 
"RAILROAD" FOR ANY PURPOSES OTHER THAN TO MAINTAIN THE 
TRACK FOR FREIGHT SERVICES, AND THE ELIMINATION OF GAPS FOR 
BICYCLE SAFETY IS NOT NECESSARY FOR FREIGHT SERVICE. 
SLCSR did not assume any duty UTA, as the railroad owner, owed to bicyclists to 
eliminate small gaps from UTA's crossing surfaces. There is absolutely no evidence 
whatsoever that SLCSR tried to eliminate gaps of that nature, and Goebels never have 
argued otherwise. However, Goebels did argue before the trial court that SLCSR 
assumed the duty to do so through its coordination agreement with UTA or otherwise 
somehow voluntarily undertook that duty within the meaning of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 324A (1965). The trial court disagreed, ruling no duty of care was owed by 
SLCSR to Goebels under SLCSR's agreement with UTA or § 342A. R. 6669, 
paragraphs 2 and 3. Goebels now argue in their Points VLB. and D. that the trial court 
was wrong, although they admit such error is not sufficient to require a new trial. 
Goebels ask the Court to consider this issue only in the event this case is remanded for a 
new trial. The trial court was correct in its ruling on this issue. 
The SLCSR/UTA agreement at paragraph 2.1, that: 
[SLCSR] shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and shall not conduct, 
-47-
directly or indirectly,... any other activity whatsoever on the Right-of-Way 
that is not necessary to Freight Rail Service. 
Goebels' Addendum at 48-49. "Freight Rail Service" is defined in the agreement as "the 
common carrier rail freight operations to be conducted by [SLCSR] on the Right-of-
Way." Id. at 45. Filling or reducing small gaps on crossing surfaces for bicyclists was 
not necessary to freight operations. The agreement further provides that SLCSR was to 
maintain the trackage it used "to the standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail 
Service; provided that [SLCSR] shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair and renew the 
Freight Trackage [or Joint Trackage] so as to preserve the present condition of. . . grade 
crossings . . ., as described on Exhibit "B" hereto." Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added). 
Goebels left out the above-underlined language when they quoted limited parts of 
paragraphs 3.1 and 3.3 in their Brief. Exhibit "B" of the agreement, which states that the 
grade crossings "are in good condition," must be read in context with Paragraph 2.1, 
which unambiguously relieves SLCSR of the obligation to conduct, and forbids SLCSR 
from conducting, any maintenance on UTA's railroad not strictly necessary for freight 
operations. Thus, the agreement's reference to the condition of grade crossings required 
SLCSR to keep crossings in "good condition" for freight rail service. If anything, 
Exhibit B qualifies SLCSR's exercise of discretion to maintain UTA's railroad as "it 
deems necessary" for freight service; it does not expand SLCSR's maintenance 
obligations beyond what is "necessary to Freight Rail Service." 
SLCSR does not contend, as Goebels erroneously claim, that Section 2.1 nullifies 
Sections 3.1 and 3.3. To the contrary, SLCSR only contends that these sections must be 
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read together and they must be read in their entirety without taking parts out of context. 
When read in its entirety, the agreement is not ambiguous, and the trial court's ruling is a 
correct interpretation of the agreement. 
Goebels' only other alleged basis for imposing a legal duty on SLCSR to prevent 
Mr. Goebel's accident is the "Good Samaritan Doctrine" set forth in Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 324A. That section provides: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon 
the undertaking. 
Goebels do nothing to suggest to how § 324A fits any aspect of the case at bar. SLCSR 
did not undertake any duty of UTA to eliminate gaps in rubber panels at UTA's 
crossings, and even if it had, its failure to eliminate the subject gap did not increase any 
risk of harm from that gap. Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, HH 31-33, 61 P.3d 1068, 
relied upon by Goebels, does nothing to further their cause. Goebels did not and cannot 
establish § 324A's requirement of an undertaking by SLCSR for the protection of Mr. 
Goebel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, SLCSR respectfully requests that the trial court's 
directed verdict in favor of SLCSR be affirmed and that this Court determine that the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§10-7-26, 10-7-29 and 56-1-11 and Salt Lake City 
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Ordinance 14.44.030 do not apply to SLCSR under the facts of this case. 
DATED this }Z ~"day of August, 2003. 
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E. Scott Savage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
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MISCELLANEOUS POWERS OF CITIES AND TOWNS 10-7-26 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Effect of stipulation, in public 
building or construction contract, that alter-
ations or extras must be ordered in writing, 1 
A L R 3d 1273 
Revocation, prior to execution of formal writ-
ten contract, of vote or decisions ofpubhc body 
awarding contract to bidder, 3 A L R 3d 864 
Immunity from tort liability, right of contrac-
tor with federal, state, or local public body to 
latter s, 9 A L R 3d 382 
Contract for personal services as within re-
quirement of submission of bids as condition of 
public contract, 15 A L R 3d 733 
Validity of statute^ ordinance, or charter pro-
vision requiring that workmen on public works 
be paid the prevailing or current rate of wages, 
18 A L R 3d 944 
Right of municipal corporations to recover 
back from contractor payments made under 
contract violating competitive bidding statute. 
33 A L R 3d 397 
Liability of municipality on quasi-contract 
for value of property or work furnished without 
compliance with bidding requirements, 33 
A L R 3d 1164 
Construction and operation of 'equal oppor-
tunities clause" requiring pledge against racial 
discrimination in hiring under construction 
contract, 44 A L R 3d 1283 
Validity and construction of 'no damage" 
clause with respect to delay m building or 
construction contract, 74 A L R 3d 187 
Construction contract provision excusing de-
lay caused by "severe weather,' 85 A L R 3d 
1085 
Dutv o( public authority to disclose to con-
tractor information, alleged!} in his possession 
affecting cost or feasibility of project 86 
A L R 3d 182 
Right of bidder for state or municipal con-
tract to rescind bid on ground that bid was 
based upon his own mistake or that of his 
employee 2 A L R 4th 991 
Waiver of competitive bidding requirements 
for state and local public building and construc-
tion contracts, 40 A L R 4th 968 
Public contracts authority of state or its 
subdivision to reject all bids, 52 A L R 4th 186 
Public contracts low bidder s monetary relief 
against state or local agency for nonaward of 
contract, 65 A L R 4th 93 
What are 'prevailing uages * or the like, for 
purposes of state statute requiring pavment of 
prevailing wages on public works projects 7 
A L R 5th 400 
Emplovers subject to -tate statutes requiring 
pavment of prevailing wages on public works 
projects 7 A L R 5th 444 
What projects involve work subject to state 
statutes requiring payment of prevailing wages 
on public projects 10 A L R 5th 337 
Authority of state municipality or other gov-
ernmental entitv to accent late bids for public 
works contracts, 49 A L R oth 747 
Standing of disappointed bidder on public 
contract to seek damages under 42 USCS 
§ 1983 for public authorities alleged violation 
of bidding procedures, 86 A L R Fed 904 
ARTICLE 7 
LEVY OF SPECIAL TAXES BY CITIES AND TOWNS 
10-7-21 to 10-7-25- Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 10-7-21 to 10-7-25 
(Utah Code Annotated 1953, L 1965, ch 12. 
§ 1), relating to improvements and the levy of 
special taxes by cities and towns, were repealed 
by Laws 1969, ch 27, § 43 For present provi-
sions, see § 17A-3-301 et =>eq 
10-7-26. Streets and alleys used by railway companies-
(1) As used in this section and in Sections 10-7-27, 10-7-29. 10-7-30, 10-7-31, 
10-7-32, and 10-7-33, the terms ''railway company" or "street railway company'' 
means any company which owns or operates railway tracks on. along or across 
a street or alley in any city or town 
(2) Nothing contained in this section or in the sections referred to in 
Subsection (1) shall be construed to exempt any railway company from keeping 
every portion of every street and alley used by it and upon or across which 
tracks shall be constructed at or near the grade of such streets in good and safe 
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condition for public travel, but it shall keep the same planked, paved, 
macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public travel as the governing 
body of the city or town may from time to time direct, keeping the plank, 
pavement or other surface of the street or alley level with the top of the rails 
of the track. The portions of the streets or alleys to be so kept and maintained 
by all such railway companies shall include all the space between their 
different rails and tracks and also a space outside of the outer rail of each 
outside track of at least two feet in width, and the tracks herein referred to 
shall include not only the main tracks but also all sidetracks, crossings and 
turnouts constructed for the use of such railways. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 259; C.L. Cross-References. — Municipal Improve-
1917, § 677; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-25; L. ment District Act, § 17A-3-301 et seq. 
1969, ch. 27, § 42. 
10-7-27. Street railway companies to restore streets. 
Every street railway company shall at its own expense restore the pavement, 
including the foundation thereof, of every street disturbed by it in the 
construction, reconstruction, removal or repair of its tracks, to the same 
condition as before the disturbance thereof, to the satisfaction of the governing 
body having charge of such street. The obligation imposed hereby shall, in 
cities other than cities of the first class, be in lieu and substitution of any and 
all other obligations of any such company to pave, repave or repair any street, 
or to pay any part of the cost thereof, and may be enforced in the same manner 
as similar obligations are or may be enforced under the laws of this state. 
Nothing herein contained shall be considered to relieve any such company 
from the repayment of any money which has heretofore been advanced or 
expended by any city for any paving heretofore done under or by virtue of a 
specific contract or agreement made and entered into between the board of 
commissioners or the city council of any city and such company providing for 
the repayment thereof, but the obligation for such repayment shall be and 
remain enforceable as if this section had not been passed. 
History: L. 1927, ch. 77, § 1; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-7-26. 
10-7-28. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 10-7-28 (L. 1927, ch. 77, paving costs, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 
§ 2; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-27), relating to 27, § 43. For present provisions, see § 17A-3-
the liability of abutting property for street 301 et seq. 
10-7-29. Railway companies to repave streets. 
All railway companies shall be required to pave or repave at their own cost 
all the space between their different rails and tracks and also a space two feet 
wide outside of the outer rails of the outside tracks in any city or town, 
including all sidetracks, crossings and turnouts used by such companies. 
Where two or more companies occupy the same street or alley with separate 
tracks each company shall be responsible for its proportion of the surface of the 
street or alley occupied by all the parallel tracks as herein required. Such 
paving or repaving by such railway companies shall be done at the same time 
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condition for public travel, but it shall keep the same planked, paved, 
macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public travel as the governing 
body of the city or town may from time to time direct, keeping the plank, 
pavement or other surface of the street or alley level with the top of the rails 
of the track. The portions of the streets or alleys to be so kept and maintained 
by all such railway companies shall include all the space between their 
different rails and tracks and also a space outside of the outer rail of each 
outside track of at least two feet in width, and the tracks herein referred to 
shall include not only the main tracks but also all sidetracks, crossings and 
turnouts constructed for the use of such railways. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 259; C.L. Cross-References. — Municipal Improve-
1917, § 677; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-25; L. ment District Act, § 17A-3-301 et seq. 
1969, ch. 27, § 42. 
10-7-27. Street railway companies to restore streets. 
Every street railway company shall at its own expense restore the pavement, 
including the foundation thereof of every street disturbed by it in the 
construction, reconstruction, removal or repair of its tracks, to the same 
condition as before the disturbance thereof, to the satisfaction of the governing 
body having charge of such street. The obligation imposed hereby shall, in 
cities other than cities of the first class, be in lieu and substitution of any and 
all other obligations of any such company to pave, repave or repair any street, 
or to pay any part of the cost thereof, and may be enforced in the same manner 
as similar obligations are or may be enforced under the laws of this state. 
Nothing herein contained shall be considered to relieve any such company 
from the repayment of any money which has heretofore been advanced or 
expended by any city for any paving heretofore done under or by virtue of a 
specific contract or agreement made and entered into between the board of 
commissioners or the city council of any city and such company providing for 
the repayment thereof, but the obligation for such repayment shall be and 
remain enforceable as if this section had not been passed. 
History: L. 1927, ch. 77, § 1; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-7-26. 
10-7-28. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 10-7-28 (L. 1927, ch. 77, pavmg costs, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 
§ 2; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-27), relating to 27, § 43. For present provisions, see § 17A-3-
the liability of abutting property for street 301 et seq. 
10-7-29, Railway companies to repave streetSc 
All railway companies shall be required to pave or repave at their own cost 
all the space between their different rails and tracks and also a space two feet 
wide outside of the outer rails of the outside tracks in any city or town, 
including all sidetracks, crossings and turnouts used by such companies. 
Where two or more companies occupy the same street or alley with separate 
tracks each company shall be responsible for its proportion of the surface of the 
street or alley occupied by all the parallel tracks as herein required. Such 
paving or repaving by such railwav companies shall be done at the same time 
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and shall be of the same material and character as the paving or repaving of 
the streets or alleys upon which the track or tracks are located, unless other 
material is specially ordered by the municipality. Such railway companies 
shall be required to keep that portion of the street which they are herein 
required to pave or repave in good and proper repair, using for that purpose the 
same material as the street upon_which the track or tracks are laid at the point 
of repair or such other material as the governing body of the city may require 
and order; and as streets are hereafter paved or repaved street railway 
companies shall be required to lay in the best approved manner a rail to be 
approved by the governing body of the city. The tracks of all railway companies 
when located upon the streets or avenues of a city or town shall be kept in 
repair and safe in all respects for the use of the traveling public, and such 
companies shall be liable for all damages resulting by reason of neglect to keep 
such tracks in repair, or for obstructing the streets. For injuries to persons or 
property arising from the failure of any such company to keep its tracks in 
proper repair and free from obstructions such company shall be liable and the 
city or town shall be exempt from liability. The word "railway companies" as 
used in this section shall be taken to mean and include any persons, 
companies, corporations or associations owning or operating any street or 
other railway in any city or town. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 266; C.L. 
1917, § 684; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-28. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS street included within a proposed paving dis-
. trict had the right to file its protest to the 
Duty to repair streets. proposed improvement the same as any other 
Protest against improvement.
 p r i v a t e o w n e r o f p r o p e r t y f r o n t i n g o n t h e 
Revocation of franchise.
 s t r e e t C a v e y Q g d e n C i t y > 5 1 U t a h 1 6 6 > 1 6 9 p 
Duty to repair streets. 163 (1917). 
Street railroad was not liable for injuries to 
person driving a horse-drawn cart which over- Revocation of franchise. 
turned when it ran upon a pile of stone left in City could revoke a franchise and require a 
the street by a party which had contracted with railroad to remove its tracks for refusal to abide 
the city and the railroad to build a crosswalk, in by a covenant of the franchise ordinance requir-
absence of evidence that the railway track was ing the track to conform to any changes in 
out of repair or that there was any obstruction grade made by the city. Union Pac. R.R. v. 
upon it at the time of accident. Naylor v. Salt Public Service Comm., 103 Utah 186r 134 P.2d 
Lake City, 9 Utah 491, 35 P. 509 (1894). 469 (1943). 
Protest against improvement. 
Railroad company owning lots abutting on a 
10-7-30. Failure to pay for repairs — Lien on company's 
property. 
In the event of the refusal of any such company to pave, repave or repair as 
required herein when so directed, upon the paving or repaving of any street 
upon which its track is laid, the municipality shall have the power to pave, 
repave or repair the same, and the cost and expense of such paving, repaving 
or repairing may be collected by levy and sale of any property of such company 
in the same manner as special taxes are now or may be collected. SpeciaTtaxes 
for the purpose of paying the cost of any such paving or repaving, macadam-
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56-1-10 RAILROADS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS section granted certain privileges to the rail-
road to construct its track upon a highway in a 
Compliance with section. canyon, pass, or defile which were not limited 
Consent of freeholders.
 b y f o r m e r § 1 7 _ 5 . 3 8 j providing for consent of 
Compliance with section. freeholders when public roads were changed, or 
County commissioners and not railroads are b ? § 56'1'8' Railroad's right under this section 
judges of compliance with this section, was limited only by this section so that where 
Barboglio v. Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385 railroad complied with it with reference to 
(1923) construction of new road, freeholder along old 
road was not entitled to injunction for removal 
Consent of freeholders. of obstruction but was limited to damages for 
In an action against a railroad for obstruction the obstruction. Barboglio v. Gibson, 61 Utah 
of an old county road, it was held that this 314, 213 P. 385 (1923). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads C.J.S. — 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 114. 
§ 69. 
56-1-10. Maps of final location to be filed. 
Every company constructing or operating a railroad in this state shall within 
a reasonable time after the final location of the road file with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code a map thereof showing the route decided 
upon and the land obtained for the use thereof; and like maps of the several 
parts thereof located in the several counties through or into which the road 
may be extended shall be filed in the offices of the recorders of such counties 
respectively. Maps and profiles certified by the chief engineer, the president, 
and the secretary of the company shall be filed in the office of the company 
subject to examination by any person interested. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 441; C.L. Cross-References. — Division of Corpora-
1917, § 1235; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 77-0-10; L. tions and Commercial Code, Title 13, Chapter 
1984, ch. 67, § 28. la . 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 63. 
56-1-11. Maintenance of crossings. 
Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to 
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of 
travel crosses its road. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 445; C.L. Regulation of crossings, § 10-8-34 et seq. 
1917, § 1237; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 77-0-11. Stopping at crossings, duties of buses and 
Cross-References . — Gates at crossings, certain trucks, § 41-6-97. 
§ 10-8-83. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 56-1-11 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Contributory negligence. 
Duty owed public by railroad. 
"Good and sufficient crossing." 
—Instructions. 
—Questions of law and fact. 
Pleading. 
Contributory negl igence. 
Plaintiff who was driving horse-drawn, cov-
ered milk wagon alongside railroad track in 
place of safety and without looking attempted 
to cross track in front of engine whereupon he 
was struck was negligent as a matter of law 
and was not entitled to recovery for personal 
injuries on ground that defendant railroad 
could, by exercise of ordinary care, have seen 
him going into place of danger and prevented 
accident. Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 
35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466 (1909). 
Duty owed public by railroad. 
One driving his sheep along a public street 
through which a railroad ran was not tres-
passer, thus the railroad owed him a duty not 
only to operate its train with due care after 
discovering the sheep on the track and in per-
ilous situation, but also to use care in operation 
of its train in anticipation of dangers that 
might reasonably be expected to arise from the 
proper use of the highway by the public. Smith 
v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 35 Utah 390,100 
P. 673 (1909). 
Under this section, a railroad has a duty to 
the traveling public to maintain good and suf-
ficient crossings, and is liable for unsafe cross-
ings regardless of materials used for its con-
struction or maintenance. Van Wagoner v. 
Union Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 189, 186 P.2d 293 
(1947), opinion amended and rehearing denied, 
112 Utah 218, 189 P2d 701 (1948). 
"Good and sufficient crossing." 
—Instructions. 
Instruction that "good and sufficient cross-
ing* is crossing that is sufficient and ordinarily 
safe for traveling public to pass to and fro over, 
keeping in mind its location, whether in 
sparsely settled or populous locality, and the 
character and volume of traffic that ordinarily 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads 
§ 480e t seq . 
C.J.S. — 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 472. 
AX.I3L — Indeflniteness of automobile speed 
regulations as affecting validitv, 6 A.L.R.3d 
1326. 
may be expected to pass over it, was proper. 
Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 
P. 999 (1918). 
In wrongful-death action against railroad 
arising out of truck-train collision at crossing, 
instruction that crossing must be maintained to 
width equal to main-traveled portion of high-
way was substantially in accordance with this 
section, and refusal to instruct jury that rail-
road had duty to maintain crossing for width of 
sixteen feet was not error, especially where 
width of crossing had no causal connection with 
collision. Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 112 
Utah 189, 186 R2d 293 (1947), opinion 
amended and rehearing denied, 112 Utah 218, 
189 P.2d 701 (1948). 
Failure to give requested instruction in 
words of city ordinance on duty to plank or pave 
crossing was not prejudicial error in wrongful-
death action against railroad arising out of 
truck-train collision at crossing, where instruc-
tion on maintenance of crossing was given in 
words of this section, and was adequate to 
permit jury to find for plaintiffs if jurors be-
lieved from evidence that deceased was stalled 
because of improperly maintained crossing. 
Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 189, 
186 P.2d 293 (1947), opinion amended and 
rehearing denied, 112 Utah 218, 189 P.2d 701 
(1948). 
—Questions of law and fact. 
There being no statute specifically defining a 
"good and sufficient" crossing, the question of 
whether a certain crossing is good and suffi-
cient is ordinarily one for jury to determine 
from evidence adduced, unless it clearly ap-
pears that only one conclusion can be reason-
ably drawn from evidence respecting condition 
of crossing, in which case it becomes question of 
law for court. Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co., 52 
Utah 18, 171 P. 999 (1918). 
Pleading. 
Complaint alleging that defendant railroad, 
knowing that sheep were on its track, negli-
gently and carelessly ran, managed, operated 
and controlled a train so as to strike the sheep 
stated a good cause of action. Smith v. San 
Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 35 Utah 390, 100 P. 673 
(1909). 
Contributory negligence of child injured 
while climbing over or through railroad train 
blocking crossing, 11 A.L.R.3d 1168. 
Governmental liability for failure to reduce 
vegetation obscuring view at railroad crossing 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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14.44.010 
14.44.030 Grade crossings—Planking and 
paving. 
A. Every railway company operating within the 
boundaries of the city shall keep every portion of 
every city street or alley upon or across which their 
tracks shall be or are constructed and maintained in 
good and safe condition to accommodate public 
travel. For this purpose, each railway company will 
install and maintain the materials required in the 
manner specified from time to time in writing by 
the mayor to surface and maintain the same in good 
condition for public travel. 
B. The portions of the street or alley surfaces to 
be so maintained by all such railway companies 
shall include all the space between their different 
rails and tracks and also the space outside the outer 
rail of each outside track for a distance of two feet, 
measured from the outside edge of the rail, for the 
full width of the street or alley, including sidewalks, 
or length of said street or alley, unless otherwise 
directed by the mayor. 
C. At all times, the surface of the street or alley 
shall be maintained level with the top of the rails on 
the track. After being directed in writing to surface 
or perform maintenance work on an area of track-
age, each such railway company shall complete the 
work specified by the mayor within seven days on 
small roadway repairs or thirty days for major capi-
tal improvements, or such other reasonable time as 
specified by the city. Every railway company which 
fails or refuses to comply with such notice, within 
the time specified, shall pay to the city all costs and 
expenses incurred by the city or others at its direc-
tion for performing the required surfacing and/or 
maintenance work and the city may thereafter recov-
er such costs and expenses, including attorneys fees 
incidental thereto, in a civil action brought against 
such railway company in any court having jurisdic-
tion thereof. (Prior code § 35-1-5) 
14.44.040 Viaducts and bridges—Required 
when. 
Such railroads shall, when required by the mayor, 
construct suitable viaducts over all greets when life 
or property may be endangered by rhe ordinary 
ibull l.ukc C.is I-981 
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BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
E. Scott Savage (2865) 
Casey K. McGarvey (4882) 
Chris R. Hogle (7223) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
FILED DISTRICT COOR^  
Third Judicia: Oistric* 
OCT - 9 2GC: 
SALT Jtf^E COUN < 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD GEORGE GOEBEL and 
KATHY GOEBEL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OMNI PRODUCTS, INC., UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
UTAH TRANSIT DISTRICT, SALT 
LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, and SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING 
(1) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RULING THAT PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC 
NUISANCE CLAIMS ARE PER SE 
LIABILITY CLAIMS AND NOT 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS, AND (2) 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO FILE THIRD AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 980912368PI 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
On September 10, 2001, this matter was before the Court on two of plaintiffs' 
motions, plaintiffs' Motion for Ruling that Plaintiffs' Public Nuisance Claims Are Per Se 
Liability Claims and Not Negligence Claims, and plaintiffs' Motion to File Third Amended 
Complaint. Plaintiffs were represented by Peter C. Collins. Defendant Salt Lake City 
Southern Railroad Company was represented by Casey K. McGarvey and Chris R. 
Hogle. Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company was represented by Kent W. 
Hansen. Defendant Utah Transit Authority was represented by Jesse C. Trentadue. 
Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation was represented by Martha S. Stonebrook. 
Having reviewed plaintiffs' motions, the pleadings and papers on file with the Court, and 
authorities cited and submitted in connection with the motions and heard oral argument 
and for good cause shown, the Court hereby ORDERS: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Ruling that Plaintiffs' Public Nuisance Claims Are Per 
Se Liability Claims and Not Negligence Claims is DENIED. Plaintiffs' public nuisance 
claims, as alleged in plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, are not strict liability or per 
se claims. Therefore, to prevail on their public nuisance claims, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that the defendants' alleged conduct with respect to the purported public 
nuisance was unreasonable, meaning intentional, negligent, reckless, or ultra-
hazardous. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint, in which 
plaintiffs sought permission to add strict liability or per se public nuisance claims against 
the defendants, is DENIED. 
3. In support of this Order, the Court, with one exception, adopts the points 
and authorities set forth in Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Ruling that Plaintiffs' Public Nuisance Claims Are 
2 
Per Se Liability Claims and Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint. The 
Court does not adopt Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company's contention that if the 
Court were to rule that plaintiffs' public nuisance claims were strict liability claims, 
plaintiffs would be in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. In summary, the Court denies plaintiffs' motions on the following grounds: 
a. Under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs may 
add a claim for relief only with written consent of the defendants or with leave of Court. 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint does not assert a strict liability or per se public 
nuisance claim, and plaintiffs have neither defendants' consent nor leave of Court to 
add one. 
b. Plaintiffs' proposed strict liability or per se public nuisance claims 
are futile and legally insufficient. A strict liability or per se public nuisance claim is 
available only if the alleged conduct giving rise to the nuisance is specifically prohibited 
by statute. Plaintiffs have not identified a statute that specifically prohibits the 
defendants' alleged conduct. 
c. Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 and Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-26 cannot 
support strict liability or per se public nuisance claims. Neither of these statutes 
specifically prohibits the defendants' alleged conduct. 
3 
d. Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030 cannot support strict liability 
or per se public nuisance claims. This ordinance does not specifically prohibit the 
defendants' alleged conduct, and, in any event, a violation of an ordinance cannot 
support a strict liability or per se public nuisance claim. 
e. Plaintiffs may not add strict liability or per se public nuisance claims 
without pleading a statute which specifically prohibits the defendants' alleged conduct. 
Without pleading such a statute, plaintiffs' proposed strict liability or per se public 
nuisance claims would be too general and would contravene this Court's commitment to 
reducing this case down to a non-moving target and putting some finality on what this 
case is all about. 
f. Considering the discovery which has been conducted, the trial 
setting and the serious nature of plaintiffs' proposed strict liability or per se public 
nuisance claims, the defendants would be unfairly prejudiced if plaintiffs were granted 
leave to add such claims. 
g. Plaintiffs did not submit the proposed third amended complaint they 
seek leave to file. Plaintiffs provided only oblique references to the proposed 
4 
amendments they seek leave to file, and plaintiffs did not identify the substance of their 
proposed amendments until they submitted the last memorandum on their motions. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 2001. 
BY JHE COURT;.:. 
I 
Hohbrat 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, LC. BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
Ot.Ps&a 
Peter C. Collins 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
SUITTER AXLAND 
E. Scott Savage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
Chris R. Hogle 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co., Inc. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
LAW DEPARTMENT 
J£sse C. Trentadue 
Kathleen Liuzzi 
175 South West Temple, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Utah Transit Authority 
IHansen 
tOO West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Union Pacific Railroad Company 
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
ORDER DENYING (1) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RULING THAT PLAINTIFFS' 
PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS ARE PER SE LIABILITY CLAIMS AND NOT 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS, AND (2) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD 
AMENDED COMPLAINT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this f ^ day of October, 
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Law Department 
280 South 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Martha Stonebrook 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney 
451 South State Street, #505 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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c 
I 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
E. Scott Savage (2865) 
Casey K. McGarvey (4882) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)328-2200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Am 
EDWARD GEORGE GOEBEL and 
KATHY GOEBEL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OMNI PRODUCTS, INC., UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
UTAH TRANSIT DISTRICT, SALT 
LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, and SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER REGARDING SALT LAKE 
CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, INC.'S DUTY TO 
PLAINTIFFS AND GRANTING SALT 
LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
Civil No. 980912368PI 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
The above-entitled matter was tried to a jury commencing on July 9, 2002. On July 17, 
2002, plaintiffs closed their case in chief and rested. At that time, defendant Salt Lake City 
Southern Railroad Company, Inc. ("Southern") moved for directed verdict and later that day 
renewed its motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence after Southern rested its 
case and the plaintiffs rested their rebuttal case. The motion for directed verdict was based upon 
- 1 -
each of the grounds asserted in Southern's motion for summary judgment previously filed, 
briefed, argued before, and denied by the Court. Southern was represented by E. Scott Savage 
and Casey K. McGarvey, and plaintiffs were represented by Peter C. Collins. 
The Honorable Tyrone Medley having seen and heard all of the evidence presented 
during trial, having heard oral argument, and having considered the briefs and materials 
submitted by the parties on the issues raised by Southern's motions for summary judgment and 
directed verdict, hereby finds and concludes: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§10-7-26, 10-7-9, 56-1-11 and Salt Lake City Ordinance 
14.44.030 are applicable to Southern under the facts of this case, and Southern owed plaintiffs a 
duty of reasonable care under those provisions and also by reason of its utilization of the 
easement granted it by the Union Pacific Railroad Company. 
2. Southern owed plaintiffs no duty under principles recognized in the Restatement, 
Second, of Torts §324A or under the "good Samaritan" doctrine. 
3. The agreements, including but not limited to the Administration and Coordination 
Agreement of March 1993, between Southern and the Utah Transit Authority, are clear and 
unambiguous and Southern owed plaintiffs no duty of care under any such agreement. 
4. No witness testified that he or she had observed the existence of a gap between 
the seams of the rubber pads at the crossing at 1700 South which appeared to be hazardous or 
potentially hazardous to bicyclists at any time prior to the date of the subject accident. Similarly, 
there was no evidence of the existence of any maintenance record, report, inspection or other 
documentation of the existence of such a gap prior to the date of the subject accident. To the 
-2-
contrary, every witness who observed the crossing before the accident and/or who was in a 
position to learn of any complaints about the surface of the subject crossing testified that they did 
not observe such a gap or learn of any complaint or claim of the existence of such a gap at any 
time prior to the date of the subject accident. Thus, viewing the evidence presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to plaintiffs, there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in 
this case because plaintiffs have established no competent evidence that a dangerous gap existed 
between crossing surface pads for a period of time prior to Mr. Goebel's accident sufficient to 
allow Southern to discover such a gap and remedy it. Without such evidence, Southern is 
entitled to a grant of its motion for a directed verdict. In this regard, the evidence at most 
establishes that gaps develop over time, but that evidence does not, in the Court's view, constitute 
sufficient evidence to allow the jury to make a reasonable inference as to whether and, if so, how 
long a dangerous gap existed prior to the occurrence of Mr. Goebel's accident. 
5. Although any "protuberance" immediately east of the easternmost part of the 
crossing surface may very well have been a factor in Mr. Goebel's accident. Southern's alleged 
failure to remedy the condition of some protuberance was not a proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's 
accident. It is the particular alleged dangerous gap that was the proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's 
accident. The fact that evidence may be in conflict as to the existence of a protuberance and the 
duration of the existence of any protuberance is not significant, in this Court's view, because it is 
the alleged gap which was the proximate cause of the accident and Mr. Goebel's injuries. 
-3-
6. Southern also is entitled to a grant of a directed verdict on plaintiffs' public 
nuisance cause of action. The Court determines, on the facts of this case, that if there is no 
negligence, there is no public nuisance. 
7. Southern is not entitled to directed verdict on any of the bases raised in Southern's 
motion for summary judgment or motion for directed verdict other than those regarding notice of 
and opportunity to remedy a dangerous condition. 
The Court bases its ruling on the authority and analysis that is set forth in the portions of 
Southern's memoranda in support of its motion for summary judgment which address the issue of 
an absence of notice of a dangerous condition and opportunity to remedy, and for all the reasons 
stated from the bench in open Court and on the record on July 18, 2002. Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Southern's motion for directed verdict is GRANTED 
and the plaintiffs' causes of action against Southern are dismissed with prejudice and upon the 
merits. 
1Q / / DATED this< / day of L t /U^T , 2002. 
•><o 
COURT: 
able Tyrone E. Medle 
Judicial District Coutt Judge 
. m^ n-'-, • 
-:.••>'?'-' 
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uuni 
Approvers to form: 
Peter C.Collins 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
7* E. Scott Savage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. 
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Tab 7 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
E. Scott Savage (2865) 
Casey K. McGarvey (4882) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)328-2200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD GEORGE GOEBEL and 
KATHY GOEBEL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OMNI PRODUCTS, INC., UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
UTAH TRANSIT DISTRICT, SALT 
LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, and SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION, INC., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL AS TO 
SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, INC. 
Civil No. 980912368PI 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial beginning July 9, 2002. Plaintiffs, 
Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel ("Goebels"), were represented by Peter C. Collins, and 
defendant Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc ("Southern") was represented by E. 
Scott Savage and Casey K. McGarvey. The Court having entered its Order Regarding Salt Lake 
-1-
City Southern Railroad Company, Inc's Duty to Plaintiffs and Granting Salt Lake City Southern 
Railroad Company, Inc's Motion For Directed Verdict, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of Southern and against the Goebels, no cause of action, and Southern is 
awarded its costs in the amount of $ 
DATED this-
<lMi^Un^ fZuj^CcL 
Judicial District Court Judgl^. 
Approved as to form: 
Peter C. Collins 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
-2-
Tab 8 
/ 
H 1 1 i \-
H 1 1
 H 
H 1 1 1 1 H 
-ffl 1 1 1 1 1 1-
* ' • * -
XTT £ H 1 h-
H , >_ 
-1 1 1 *- _ | j 
I h- H j 1 gjt- H 1 » 1 1 y= 
TT-f- T#/£* "0AJt?-Gri6+fT-*&+f 
-\ 1 1 i 1 f 1-
H 1 1 - - \ 1 ffln h-
_i , , H 1 y-\ i H 
z O 
H 
X 
OS 
CO -
o 
91 ro 
CD o 
GO. 
o 
o 
<S 
© o o 
CO 
O 
C 
57 
Tab 9 
Exhibit D-4 
With the pads numbered 
Exhibit D-4 
W4fVi/-»nf f h p n a H c rmmV>prpH 
Tab 10 

Tab 11 

